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Thirteenth Amendment Echoes in Fourteenth
Amendment Doctrine
CHRISTOPHER W. SCHMIDT†
This Article argues that to better understand the historical development of Fourteenth Amendment
antidiscrimination doctrine, we should look to the Thirteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth
Amendment was drafted in response to debates over the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment;
it was widely understood at the time of ratification as building upon the constitutional
commitments embodied in the Thirteenth Amendment; and assumptions about liberty and equality
more commonly associated with the Thirteenth Amendment have had a recurring, if
underappreciated, influence on judicial interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I trace these Thirteenth Amendment influences on the Fourteenth Amendment from
Reconstruction to some of the Supreme Court’s most important twentieth-century racial
discrimination cases—such as Buchanan v. Warley, Shelley v. Kraemer, and Brown v. Board of
Education—and through more recent decisions, including Obergefell v. Hodges, that extend
constitutional antidiscrimination protections beyond race. Once we recover these recurrent,
consequential, but rarely acknowledged Thirteenth Amendment echoes in Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine, we can recognize the existence of a constitutional principle that operates alongside the
tiers-of-scrutiny approach that dominates modern Fourteenth Amendment doctrine. This
principle—which I label the principle of equality of rights—modulates the strength of the
nondiscrimination requirement to account for the importance of the sphere of activity at issue.
Despite its simplicity and intuitive attractiveness, and its foundations in the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, the equality of rights principle has proven deeply
unsettling across time, feared both for its potential to radically expand the reach of constitutional
antidiscrimination norms and its potential to excessively constrain these norms. I argue that if
constitutional law were to recognize and accept this principle, our Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine would better reflect foundational commitments of Reconstruction, better explain the
Court’s most consequential interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, and better serve the
needs of a nation still struggling to realize the emancipatory vision of the Thirteenth Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
Students of constitutional law quickly learn two things about the limits the
Fourteenth Amendment places on the ability of government to treat different
groups differently: there are the rules, which involve doctrines of state action,
suspect classifications, fundamental rights, and levels of scrutiny; and there are
the canonical cases, most of which break these rules.
At the apex of the Fourteenth Amendment antidiscrimination canon stands
Brown v. Board of Education,1 a case in which the Supreme Court reached the
right outcome only by engaging in a series of obfuscations and half-hearted
rationalizations. Another canonical rulebreaker is Shelley v. Kraemer,2 in which
the Court declared unconstitutional judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
housing covenants. The reasoning of this seminal case in the development of the
state action doctrine has baffled generations of scholars and students alike. In
Plyler v. Doe3 the Court held that Texas could not exclude undocumented
immigrant children from public schools only by sidestepping its own supposed
rules for how to interpret the Equal Protection Clause. In recent years, Justice
Anthony Kennedy led the Court on some unorthodox doctrinal excursions on
the way to expanding constitutional protections against sexual orientation
discrimination. His 2015 opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges,4 with its proudly
amorphous blend of due process and equal protection doctrine, is notoriously
difficult to explain using the standard tools of constitutional doctrine. The
pantheon of rulings expanding constitutional protection against discrimination
is filled with doctrinal troublemakers.
This Article offers an account of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine that
better explains and justifies these and other landmark antidiscrimination cases.
I show how the Supreme Court, in persistent if underappreciated ways, has
expanded the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections against certain forms of
discrimination by drawing upon assumptions about liberty and equality more
commonly associated with the Thirteenth Amendment. A recent generation of
scholars has sought to revitalize the Thirteenth Amendment, presenting the
amendment that declared an end to slavery as the centerpiece for a constitutional
vision radically different than what the Court currently recognizes.5 This Article
presents another argument for why the Thirteenth Amendment deserves a more
prominent place in the American constitutional tradition, one that focuses on the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
576 U.S. 644 (2015).
See, e.g., THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010); Alexander Tsesis, Into the Light of Day: Relevance of
the Thirteenth Amendment to Contemporary Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1447 (2012); Risa L. Goluboff, The
Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L.J. 1609 (2001); William M. Carter, Jr.,
Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1311 (2007).

726

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:3

subtle and often overlooked ways in which its underlying principles have long
operated in the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.
At the heart of this account is an assumption about the reach of the
Constitution’s prohibition on certain forms of discrimination that I term the
equality of rights principle. In its most abstract form, the principle is this: the
strength of the Fourteenth Amendment’s nondiscrimination requirement varies
in relation to the importance of the sphere of activity at issue. As innocuous and
common-sensical as this formulation sounds, it has no place in modern
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine. That doctrine, as law students learn every year,
revolves around a set of binary junctures: Is there state action? If not, the
Fourteenth Amendment does not apply; if so, it applies to full effect. Is there a
suspect classification, or does the classification involve a fundamental right? If
so, apply heightened judicial scrutiny; if not, apply only minimal judicial
scrutiny. This ruleset captures accurately enough the Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine that courts have used in the vast majority of equal protection cases for
at least the past half century. But recognizing the operation of this supplementary
or alternative doctrinal principle—one that turns on a set of assumptions about
the interplay between equality and the conditions of human freedom that are
more readily recognized in the history and doctrine of the Thirteenth
Amendment—allows us to better understand how the courts have changed
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine over time, and particularly those seminal
decisions that expand the reach of constitutional protections against racial and
other forms of discrimination.
Although this principle has featured in some of the most significant
Supreme Court cases in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, in only rare
instances have the Justices or contemporary legal commentators explicitly
acknowledged its existence. It does not even have a recognized name. As an
operating assumption, it moves Fourteenth Amendment doctrine in new
directions, but it does so quietly. It exerts its influence when Justices steer
constitutional law in response to their intuitions about freedom and equality, but
because it is assumed to lack a lineage, because it is assumed to be not the
application of accepted doctrinal rules but the bending or even abandonment of
those rules, it arrives furtively, its role obscured by smokescreens (Chief Justice
Warren’s references to social science in Brown, Justice Brennan’s doctrinal
slights of hand in Plyler, Justice Kennedy’s philosophical ruminations in
Obergefell) or explanatory lacunae (Shelley). Supreme Court Justices and legal
scholars have periodically sought to recognize some version of this principle as
its own doctrinal formula, but these efforts have had little success.6
6. One prominent example was Justice Thurgood Marshall’s efforts in the 1970s to introduce a “sliding
scales” alternative to the tiers of scrutiny analysis in equal protection doctrine. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
520–21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961–1991, at 94–115 (1997). I discuss Marshall’s sliding scales
approach in Part V, infra.
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The primary contribution of this Article is descriptive. I seek to identify
this overlooked and undervalued principle; to give it a label;7 to reconstruct its
genealogy; and to explain why judges and scholars have been unable or
unwilling to recognize and accept it as a legitimate approach to interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment.8
By bringing the equality of rights principle to light, I also advance, albeit
more tentatively, a normative claim. Our constitutional tradition is enriched
when we treat the Supreme Court’s greatest egalitarian decisions not as doctrinal
aberrations or rulebreakers, but as moments when the Court put on display an
alternative register of constitutional reasoning. When understood in the context
of the history of equality of rights, rulings such as Shelley, Brown, Plyler, and
Obergefell provide a roadmap to a different way of thinking about equal
protection doctrine. It is an approach that is more responsive to the ways in
7. The label I adopt, “equality of rights,” can be traced back to Reconstruction-era legal debates. See, e.g.,
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2502 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Raymond) (describing the Fourteenth
Amendment as “securing an equality of rights among all the citizens of the United States”); 2 CONG. REC. 414
(1874) (remarks of Rep. Lawrence) (“Equality of civil and political rights . . . is simple justice. The [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment was designed to secure this equality of rights . . . .”). Several legal scholars have identified
equality of rights as a key concept of Reconstruction constitutionalism. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 984, 993, 998, 1127, 1137 (1995); John
Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J 1385, 1393, 1470 (1992). Legal
scholars have labeled closely related constitutional principles as “substantive equal protection” and “equal
citizenship.” For “substantive equal protection,” see Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection
of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 361–65 (1949); Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Reitman v.
Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 39 (1967); for “equal citizenship”
see Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1977). The former centers on what is sometimes referred to as the “fundamental rights prong” of equal
protection doctrine, and thus does not quite capture the principle at the center of this Article. (In brief: Under
equal protection’s fundamental rights prong, the strict scrutiny standard is triggered based on the nature of the
right at issue, regardless of the classification. The equality of rights principle is different in that heightened
scrutiny is triggered by a combined analysis of the nature of the right and the nature of the classification.). The
“equal citizenship” concept comes closer, but, for my purposes, the emphasis on citizenship risks (a) losing the
vital connection to the Thirteenth Amendment, which revolves around the principle of freedom rather than
citizenship; and (b) sweeping so broadly so as to lose the constraining dynamic that I argue is key to the historical
persistence of the equality of rights principle. Equal citizenship also risks excluding equal protection cases
involving non-citizens, such as Plyler.
8. My claim that the equality of rights principle has yet to receive its due may fail to adequately credit
recent scholarship describing and defending interlinkages between due process and equal protection. See, e.g.,
Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 473 (2002); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747
(2011); Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L.
REV. 817 (2014); Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147
(2015); Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16 (2015). There are
parallels between what Laurence Tribe has called the “legal double helix” of substantive due process and equal
protection and the nondiscrimination principle I examine in this Article, particularly in its more recent
manifestations in the Supreme Court’s sexual orientation decisions. Perhaps in recent years the equality of civil
rights principle has to some extent converged with Tribe’s legal double helix. But the principle that Tribe and
others defend centers on the fundamental right strand of the Due Process Clause, the content of which they argue
equality values help to clarify. This is distinct from the equality of rights principle, which is, at base, a
nondiscrimination principle. Furthermore, even if the two legal principles have ultimately arrived at a similar
place, their historical trajectories are quite different.
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which changes in social norms inform the boundaries of constitutional equality
while also reaffirming the foundational commitments of the generation of
Americans who reconstructed the Constitution in the aftermath of the Civil War.
Thirteenth Amendment principles have infused the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment from its drafting in 1866 through today, and recognizing this puts
us in a better position to add our own chapter to this history.
This Article contains five Parts. Part I locates the origins of the equality of
rights principle in the Reconstruction era. I show how this principle was born
from the Thirteenth Amendment, codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
injected back into the Constitution through the Fourteenth Amendment, and then
reaffirmed (albeit in qualified form) in the Supreme Court’s initial efforts to
interpret the Reconstruction Amendments. Its defenders assumed a commitment
to racial nondiscrimination not as a general matter, but only when certain basic
rights—typically labelled “civil rights”—were at stake. The application of
constitutional limits on discriminatory policy and practices thus required an
assessment of the relative importance of the activity at issue, and that assessment
involved judgments about the conditions necessary for human freedom. If the
state allowed private actors to deny Black Americans their civil rights, then this
too could violate the Fourteenth Amendment: the state action doctrine that the
Court soon developed was a partial abandonment of the equality of rights
principle.
The first iteration of equality of rights as a constitutional principle during
Reconstruction was conspicuously limited. The idea that the Constitution would
protect civil rights against racial discrimination assumed that other forms of
discrimination—discrimination involving “political” or “social” rights—would
be permitted. Leading African Americans and their allies decried the limitations
of this approach to constitutional equality; from a modern perspective the entire
Reconstruction-era idea of civil rights may appear little more than a vehicle for
neutering the Fourteenth Amendment.9 Yet the equality of rights principle also
had—and still has—underappreciated egalitarian potential. As I hope to show in
this Article, the powerful if amorphous blend of the emancipatory ideals of the
Thirteenth Amendment and the egalitarian commitments of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act and Fourteenth Amendment suggest an approach to determining the
reach of constitutional limits on racial discrimination more robust and
responsive than our current equal protection doctrine.
Part II explains how political, doctrinal, and linguistic developments in the
late nineteenth century obscured the equality of rights principle. As a political
matter, the idea of a variable application of nondiscrimination constraints faced
critics from all sides. It was too limited for some (particularly as narrowly
applied by the Supreme Court), too open-ended for others. As a doctrinal matter,
9. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689,
1696–97 (2005); Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause,
Dr. Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HIST. 884, 885 (1987).
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the Court’s narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or
Immunities Clause in the Slaughterhouse Cases10 removed the most viable
textual basis for the equality of rights principle. And as a linguistic matter, the
public meaning of the term “civil rights” shifted in the late nineteenth century.
The concept of civil rights that had solidified in post-Thirteenth Amendment
debates over the requirements of freedom retained a vestigial presence in
American constitutionalism, and judges drew upon it at key moments of
constitutional development, but they struggled to explain what they were doing.
The next two Parts explore Fourteenth Amendment cases involving racial
discrimination that illuminate the persistent if rarely recognized influence of
Thirteenth Amendment principles on equal protection doctrine. These cases
show how, even as the equality of rights principle became more and more
difficult to discern in the twentieth century, it still played a significant role in the
development of the Supreme Court’s racial equality jurisprudence.
Part III looks at two cases decided prior to the Court’s adoption of its tiers
of scrutiny framework in which the Court struck down racially discriminatory
policies: Buchanan v. Warley,11 where the Court struck down a residential
segregation policy, and Brown v. Board of Education.12 These cases are often
categorized as aberrations or hopeful harbingers of a more protective
antidiscrimination regime to come. But they can also be understood by looking
backward, to the Thirteenth Amendment-derived concept of civil rights that the
Court occasionally drew on (sometimes self-consciously and explicitly,
sometimes more intuitively) when interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine.
Part IV considers another line of racial discrimination cases that fit
awkwardly in modern equal protection doctrine: cases that strain against the
Court’s “state action” limitation on the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. I
consider two cases: Shelley v. Kraemer and Bell v. Maryland.13 In Shelley, the
Supreme Court expanded the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment by drawing
on semi-articulated assumptions about race and rights that can be traced to
Reconstruction-era debates over constitutional protections of civil rights against
racial discrimination. In Bell, in which the Court confronted the question of
whether racial discrimination in privately operated public accommodations
violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court chose not to follow Shelley; the
majority refused to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to private businesses,
regardless of the significance of their role in society. I focus on Justice Arthur
Goldberg’s dissent, in which he used the equality of rights principle to argue that
segregation in public accommodations violated the Constitution.

10.
11.
12.
13.

83 U.S. 36, 80–81 (1873).
245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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Part V shows how the equality of rights principle operated in Fourteenth
Amendment cases involving discrimination outside the race context. Although
the connection to the Thirteenth Amendment became more attenuated, the basic
analytical framework was the same in these cases. The Court considered how
particular lines of discrimination operated in particular spheres of activity and
then arrived at a constitutional judgment based on an assessment of whether the
result amounts to a denial of the conditions of freedom for the subordinated
group. At the center of this doctrinal genealogy is Plyler v. Doe, a ruling that
deserves to stand alongside Brown as the landmark cases of a reimagined equal
protection doctrine that embraces its roots in the Thirteenth Amendment. This
genealogy also helps to explain the Court’s cases striking down discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation, including the seminal case of Obergefell v.
Hodges.
Once we acknowledge the Thirteenth Amendment echoes in Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine, we see that key historical junctures in the Supreme
Court’s equality jurisprudence are not necessarily instances in which the Justices
had to abandon their own rules to reach a just result. They become examples of
the Court drawing on a principle of constitutional equality that traces back to the
creation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Recognizing this history allows us to
better understand—and build upon—an approach to constitutional interpretation
that has allowed for the Court’s most consequential expansions of constitutional
protection against oppressive forms of discrimination.
I. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND
THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL RIGHTS
The central argument of this Article—that assumptions about liberty and
equality that have been most commonly associated with the Thirteenth
Amendment have operated in powerful and underappreciated ways in the
development of the Fourteenth Amendment—finds ample support in the
historical moment from which the two amendments emerged. Debates over the
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment led to the drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Within Congress, most supporters of the new amendment, which
Congress passed only months after the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment, saw it as reaffirming in clearer terms the equality of rights principle
that they located in the previous amendment. At the heart of this principle was
the legal concept of “civil rights,” which in 1865 and 1866 was understood to be
a category of rights that were so fundamental that to deny them because of one’s
race was to deny that person freedom. State actors were understood as primarily
responsible for ensuring these rights, but the rights (like the Thirteenth
Amendment itself) did not map onto the dichotomous state action framework
that the Supreme Court would soon develop. Many envisioned the Fourteenth
Amendment as doing more than protecting against racial discrimination in the
context of civil rights; the broad wording of the Fourteenth Amendment
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certainly left open interpretations that moved beyond its Thirteenth Amendment
foundations. But if there was a general understanding about the essential
minimum that the Fourteenth Amendment accomplished, it was this: that when
civil rights were at issue, the Constitution prohibited state actors from using—
or from allowing private actors to use—race as a qualification to access these
rights. The Fourteenth Amendment was thus inextricably connected with the
Thirteenth Amendment from its inception, with the principle of equal civil rights
as the key point of connection.
A. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
No sooner had the nation ratified the Thirteenth Amendment—which
prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude in the United States and
empowered Congress to enforce this prohibition14—than its elected leaders
turned to the question of how to use this power to ensure the freedom of the over
four million newly emancipated Black men, women, and children. The challenge
was stark. When the members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress arrived in
Washington, D.C., to start their first session in early December 1865, less than
a year after the end of the Civil War, ex-Confederates across the South were
consolidating their power. A centerpiece of their effort to regain control over
Southern local and state governments was the suppression of the formerly
enslaved. White Southerners passed what were known as “Black Codes,”
regulations that sought to reduce African Americans to second-class citizenship
and, in some cases, to new forms of slavery.15 To confront this situation,
Republicans, who held strong majorities in both houses of Congress, turned to
the Thirteenth Amendment, which was officially declared part of the
Constitution on December 18, 1865.
The challenge for Republicans with egalitarian leanings was how to secure
legislative majorities, as well as public support, for federal regulatory
interventions that were without precedent in United States history. This was a
challenge of constitutional authority: proponents of aggressive federal
intervention into southern racial politics believed the Thirteenth Amendment to
be a source of sweeping federal power, but not everyone agreed.16 And it was a
14. The full text reads:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
15. See THEODORE WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 198–210 (1988).
16. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 40–41 (1865) (remarks of Sen. Cowan) (expressing
support for civil rights protections but arguing that it would require another constitutional amendment); id. at
113 (remarks of Sen. Saulsbury) (“Slavery is a status, a condition; it is a state or situation where one man belongs
to another and is subject to his absolute control . . . . Cannot that status or condition be abolished without
attempting to confer on all former slaves all the civil or political rights that white people have? Certainly.”).
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challenge of politics: some who might accept that the Thirteenth Amendment
gave Congress certain powers did not agree with the racial egalitarian impulse
that motivated the legislation. The advent of federal prohibitions on racial
discrimination in exercising fundamental rights required some understanding of
what these rights were that the federal government could and would protect.
A focal point for this debate was the legal category “civil rights.” This was
a familiar-sounding term to mid-nineteenth-century Americans. Tracing to the
eighteenth century, it could be found in various political proclamations, legal
treatises, and judicial opinions.17 But the debate that took place in the early years
of Reconstruction demanded that this term that had been used in varied and often
quite amorphous ways be defined so as to be made the basis for statutes and
constitutional law.18
The underlying assumptions of the principle of civil rights as it emerged in
Reconstruction was not new. The idea that certain rights were more fundamental
than others and that racial discrimination should be prohibited when these
fundamental rights were at stake, even if it might be permissible elsewhere, was
integral to the lives of free African Americans before Emancipation. They
experienced a patchwork of rights protections in which the success of their
claims to equal treatment varied across time and place.19 This resulted in
frustrations and humiliations but also, as recent historical scholarship has shown,
opportunities for free Black people to successfully demand and exercise their
rights.20 When antebellum lawmakers debated the legal rights of free people of
color, some also drew on the idea of differentiated categories of rights and
argued that a racial nondiscrimination principle applied to only some of these
categories.21 Those who supported protecting Black Americans’ ability to make
contracts, to buy and sell property, and to file lawsuits often drew the line at the
franchise or interracial marriage or the right to access certain social spaces.22
17. CHRISTOPHER W. SCHMIDT, CIVIL RIGHTS IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 13–15 (2021).
18. Id. at 11–31.
19. See, e.g., KATE MASUR, UNTIL JUSTICE BE DONE: AMERICA’S FIRST CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, FROM
THE REVOLUTION TO RECONSTRUCTION (2021); MARTHA S. JONES, BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENS: A HISTORY OF RACE
AND RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (2018).
20. See, e.g., MASUR, supra note 19; DYLAN C. PENNINGROTH, THE CLAIMS OF KINFOLK: AFRICAN
AMERICAN PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH (2003); KATE MASUR, AN
EXAMPLE FOR ALL THE LAND: EMANCIPATION AND THE STRUGGLE OVER EQUALITY IN WASHINGTON, D.C.
(2010); STEPHEN KANTROWITZ, MORE THAN FREEDOM: FIGHTING FOR BLACK CITIZENSHIP IN A WHITE
REPUBLIC, 1829–1889 (2012); JONES, supra note 19, at 2–3; KIMBERLY M. WELCH, BLACK LITIGANTS IN THE
ANTEBELLUM AMERICAN SOUTH (2018).
21. ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE
THE CIVIL WAR 290–95 (1970); James Oakes, Natural Rights, Citizenship Rights, State Rights, and Black Rights:
Another Look at Lincoln and Race, in OUR LINCOLN 109–34 (Eric Foner ed., 2008); ERIC FONER, THE FIERY
TRIAL: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN SLAVERY 118–20 (2010); GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN
THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: THE CONSTITUTION, COMMON LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866, at 18–39
(2013).
22. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Charleston, Illinois (Sept. 18, 1858) in COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: VOLUME 3 145–46 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (asserting that Black people were “equal in
their right to ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,’” yet rejecting “in any way the social and political
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Racial discrimination was impermissible when it came to the “civil” rights that
constituted the essential conditions of freedom, but the same rule did not apply
when “political” or “social” rights were at stake—or so the reasoning went.
During Reconstruction, Black Americans and their white allies advocated
the protection of certain fundamental rights against denial on the grounds of race
as necessary to the project of emancipation. Hence, proponents of the
codification of these rights in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 saw the Thirteenth
Amendment as providing the necessary constitutional authority. According to
Senator Lyman Trumbull, “It is idle to say that a man is free who cannot go and
come at pleasure, who cannot buy and sell, who cannot enforce his rights. These
are rights which the first clause of the [Thirteenth Amendment] meant to secure
to all.”23 Federal civil rights legislation was designed to protect these
fundamental rights. As Trumbull put it, “any statute which is not equal to all,
and which deprives any citizen of civil rights which are secured to other citizens,
is an unjust encroachment upon his liberty, and is in fact, a badge of servitude
which, by the Constitution, is prohibited.”24
Samuel Shellabarger, a Republican House member from Ohio, offered a
particularly clear articulation of the equality of rights principle. The idea of civil
rights was not a purely substantive right, Shellabarger explained; it was a right
whose significance, at least with regard to federal intervention, was inextricably
connected with an antidiscrimination principle. The “whole effect” of the Civil
Rights Act, he explained, “is not to confer or regulate rights, but to require that
whatever of these enumerated rights and obligations are imposed by State laws
shall be for and upon all citizens alike without distinctions based on race or
former condition in slavery.”25
The equality of rights principle thus provided a foundation for claims of
radical change in American racial politics, while at the same time serving as a
limiting principle for this change. This theme has remained a central reason for
the principle’s resilience across time.
B. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, passed by Congress on
June 13, 1866, and ratified on July 9, 1868, was to constitutionalize the Civil

equality of the black and white races” and explaining that he was not “in favor of making voters or jurors of
negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people”).
23. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1865).
24. Id. at 474.
25. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 (1866); see also id. at 1760 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull)
(“The bill neither confers nor abridges the rights of any one, but simply declares that in civil rights there shall
be an equality among all classes of citizens, and that all alike shall be subject to the same punishment Each State,
so that it does not abridge the great fundamental rights belonging, under the Constitution, to all citizens, may
grant or withhold such civil rights as it pleases; all that is required is that, in this respect, its laws shall be
impartial.”).
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Rights Act of 1866.26 Defenders of the Civil Rights Act feared the statute, which
only passed over the veto of President Andrew Johnson, might be repealed by a
future Congress or overturned in the Supreme Court.27 Placing its protections on
more secure footing by passing the Fourteenth Amendment would, one House
member explained optimistically, elevate “that great and good law above the
reach of political strife, beyond the reach of the plots and machinations of any
party, and fix it in the serene sky, in the eternal firmament of the Constitution,
where no storm of passion can shake it and no cloud can obscure it.”28
An early version of the Fourteenth Amendment included a prohibition on
racial discrimination “as to civil rights.”29 This language, which would have
provided an explicit textual basis for the equality of rights principle, never made
it beyond the committee.30 Instead of a prohibition on racial discrimination in
the exercise of civil rights, the final version of what would become Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment protected against the deprivation of “liberty, or
property, without due process of law,” the denial of the “equal protection of the
laws,” and the abridgement of the “privileges or immunities of citizens”—a
category members of Congress seemed to assume functionally equivalent to
“civil rights.”31 Not having been a recent focal point of legislative debate, this
phrase had somewhat more ambiguity than did “civil rights”—an attribute that
likely proved attractive to some of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.32

26. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong, 1st Sess. 2464 (1866) (Rep. Thayer); id. at 2498 (Rep. Broomall); id. at
2502 (Rep. Raymond); id. at 2511 (Rep. Eliot); see also Kurt T. Lash, Enforcing the Rights of Due Process: The
Original Relationship Between the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 106 GEO. L.J. 1389
(2018); Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consummation to
Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 200 (1951); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 48, 104, 216 n.8 (1988);
RUTHERGLEN, supra note 21, 70–80.
27. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (Rep. Thaddeus Stevens) (warning that “the first time
the South with their copperhead allies obtain command of Congress [the Civil Rights Act] will be repealed”);
RUTHERGLEN, supra note 21, at 70–80.
28. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2462 (1866) (Rep. James A. Garfield).
29. BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION,
39TH CONGRESS, 1865–1867, at 83 (1914) (“No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United
States, as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”).
30. Id. at 83, 106, 301.
31. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2286 (1866). Early drafts of the Civil Rights Act included the
phrase “civil rights and immunities.” Id. at 43, 1118. On the history of the phrase “privileges or immunities,”
see KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP (2014); Harrison, supra note 7, at 1416–20. According to John Harrison, “in 1866, when people
discussed abridgments of the privileges or immunities of citizens, they mainly were talking about laws that
deprived certain classes of citizens of the civil rights accorded to everyone else.” Harrison, supra note 7, at 1388.
See also id. at 1397, 1416; CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2883 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Latham).
32. GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, REMINISCENCES OF SIXTY YEARS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS 41–42 (1902). As
William Nelson has pointed out, the ambiguity of the text of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment must be
seen on some level as a conscious choice of its drafters. They had at their disposal relatively more precise
language (including “civil rights”). Yet they opted for ambiguity. NELSON, supra note 26, at 60–61; see also
David P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 403 (2008) (“Surprisingly little energy
was expended in attempting to explain what the central provisions of § 1 were intended to do.”).
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Exactly what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment believed the
Amendment would accomplish has been the subject of extensive debate. Jurists,
legal scholars, and historians have pored over the records of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress to determine whether the framers saw the Fourteenth Amendment as
“incorporating” the Bill of Rights,33 protecting unenumerated rights,34 and
prohibiting segregation in schools.35 Without wading into the deep waters of
these long-running debates, the relevant point for the purposes of this Article is
that there is scholarly agreement that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment
understood it to provide a constitutional foundation for the concept of civil rights
that was codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and that this seemed to be the
general understanding of the Amendment outside of Congress. It is fair to say,
then, that the principle of equality of civil rights was a part of the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL RIGHTS
Despite the assurances advocates of federal civil rights legislation often
made about the bounded qualities of civil rights, the category’s borders were
never stable—at least not while there was political demand for expanding the
federal government’s role in protecting Black Americans. Each civil rights
victory provided an opportunity to reassess what was contained in this vital
category. Each victory offered a stepping stone for African Americans and their
allies to claim more rights as necessities of the freedom the Thirteenth
Amendment promised.36
The first major expansion of civil rights came in the immediate aftermath
of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment, when Republican lawmakers extended constitutional protections
against racial discrimination to voting rights. A sharp distinction between civil
rights and political rights was a guiding assumption during debates over the 1866
Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment, but Black activists, along with
some more dedicated white egalitarians, had resisted the distinction.37 The right
to vote, they insisted, was every bit as fundamental—every bit a measure of true
freedom (for men, at least)—as the right to make contracts and own property.38
33. See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN.
L. REV. 5 (1949); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998);
LASH, supra note 31.
34. See, e.g., tenBroek, supra note 26; AMAR, supra note 33; LASH, supra note 31.
35. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1955); McConnell, supra note 7; Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional
Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995).
36. See Christopher W. Schmidt, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Transformation of Civil Rights, 10 J.
CIV. WAR ERA 81 (2020).
37. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 26.
38. See, e.g., Black Residents of Nashville to the Union Convention, FREEDMEN & S. SOC’Y PROJECT (Jan.
9, 1865), http://www.freedmen.umd.edu/tenncon.htm (calling for the right to vote and testify in court, which the
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With the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, the civil rights-political
distinction lost much of its relevance. In legal discourse thereafter, voting rights
were often batched together with other basic rights as “civil and political rights”
or all these rights were subsumed under the “civil rights” label.39
The next major congressional debate over the meaning of civil rights
involved the distinction between civil rights and social rights. This was a key
point of dispute in the five-year debate that culminated in the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, which guaranteed “full and equal enjoyment,” without
regard to race, “of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other
places of public amusement.”40 An early version of the law also included
schools. Defenders of the law insisted that racial equality in access to public
accommodations and schools, like racial equality in making contracts, buying
and selling property, and suing and testifying in court, was a basic condition of
freedom and therefore properly understood as civil rights, not social rights.41
The Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the authority, perhaps the
obligation, to banish racial discrimination in this realm of society. The bill’s
sponsors titled it “An Act to Protect All Citizens in Their Civil and Legal
Rights”; supporters referred to it as the “supplementary civil rights bill” and
defended it as a necessary extension of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.42 “Equitable
civil rights,” insisted one supporter of the law, were as important a fight as
emancipation itself.43
The definition of civil rights offered by proponents of the 1875 Civil Rights
Act never secured broad support. The law only narrowly passed through a lame
duck Republican-controlled Congress, it was never seriously enforced, and the
Supreme Court would soon strike it down.44 Yet the debate over the ill-fated
1875 law was a key moment in the early history of the equality of rights
principle. It shows that civil rights—a concept that was central to the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment—was never a closed category. It shows
that from the beginning, people understood its boundaries as open to possible
new claims, and that the question of whether to include a rights claim into the
statement referred as a matter of “equal rights” and “civil rights”); Frederick Douglass, Speech of Frederick
Douglas, LIBERATOR (Feb. 10, 1865), in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS: THE ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS
I:522 (Kurt T. Lash ed., 2021) (lacking the vote, the Black man “is the slave of society, and holds his liberty as
a privilege, not as a right”).
39. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 30.
40. 18 STAT. 335 (1875).
41. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 34–41.
42. See, e.g., Mr. Sumner’s Civil Rights Bill, HARPER’S WKLY., Apr. 11, 1874, at 310 (describing the
legislation as “the completion of the promise of equal civil rights which we have already made” in the 1866 Civil
Rights Act). On the 1875 Civil Rights Act, see Bertram Wyatt-Brown, The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 W. POL.
Q. 763 (1965); McConnell, supra note 7; Amy Dru Stanley, Slave Emancipation and the Revolutionizing of
Human Rights, in THE WORLD THE CIVIL WAR MADE 269–303 (Gregory P. Downs & Kate Masur eds., 2015).
43. J.D. Lewis, Letter to the Editor, Equal Civil Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 1, 1875, at 7.
44. Valeria W. Weaver, The Failure of Civil Rights 1875–1883 and Its Repercussions, 54 J. NEGRO
HIST. 368 (1969); John Hope Franklin, Enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 6 PROLOGUE 225 (1974);
Civil Rights Cases Decided, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1883, at 4; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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category would revolve around an assessment of what it meant to be a fully free
individual in American society. Thus, we see Thirteenth Amendment principles
infusing the earliest efforts in Congress to give meaning to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
D. CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE SUPREME COURT
1. The “One Great Purpose”
As the Supreme Court struggled to come to terms with the effects of the
Civil War and Reconstruction on legal protections for individual rights and the
balance of authority between the national government and the states, the legal
category of civil rights provided an essential touchstone. It was attractive to the
Justices for the same reasons it was attractive to the members of Congress who
advocated for civil rights legislation: it allowed them to express a commitment
to a national norm of equality, but one that was bounded. The Justices disagreed
on where exactly the boundaries of this nondiscrimination principle were
located, but they all agreed it had limits. They also agreed on the basic analytical
move required to draw these boundaries: an inquiry that asked whether that right
was necessary to full and free citizenship in the United States. In a legal world
turned upside down by war, emancipation, and constitutional reconstruction, the
equality of rights principle provided the Justices a point of stability and
agreement.
Although the term “civil rights” was not included in the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the lawmakers who drafted and approved the
amendment and the judges who initially interpreted it generally assumed that its
central purpose was to ensure this category of rights for freed people. In the early
years of the Fourteenth Amendment, few people gave much attention to the
division of work between the key provisions of Section 1 of the amendment—
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection
Clause. The lawmakers who voted on the Fourteenth Amendment spoke
strikingly little about the distinctive roles they envisioned for the provisions of
Section 1.45 Litigants who brought their first legal challenges under the
Fourteenth Amendment took a catchall approach, citing as support each of the
provisions of Section 1, as well as the Thirteenth Amendment.46
Early judicial interpretations echoed this aggregative approach. The
protections enumerated in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were a
package, together intended to point in a single direction, what the Supreme Court

45. See Harrison, supra note 7; NELSON, supra note 26, at 49–63; see also ERIC FONER, THE SECOND
FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION 79 (2019) (noting that in
1866, “most congressmen referred to [the individual provisions of Section 1] as a set of principles that should
be viewed as a whole and reinforce one another”).
46. See, e.g., Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 89.
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called the amendments’ “unity of purposes”47 or their “one great purpose.”48 The
“general purpose which pervades” the Reconstruction amendments was to
protect the “life, liberty, and property” of “the unfortunate race who had suffered
so much,” the Court explained in the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases.49
In the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too recent to be called
history, but which are familiar to us all, and on the most casual examination
of the language of these amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the
one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and
without which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the
freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom,
and the protection of the newly made freeman and citizen from the oppressions
of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.50

When the members of the Supreme Court wanted to label this “general
purpose,” they often used the same term that members of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress had turned to: civil rights. The Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
wrote in the 1880 jury discrimination case Strauder v. West Virginia, “is one of
a series of constitutional provisions having a common purpose—namely,
securing to a race recently emancipated, a race that, through many generations,
had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy.”51 What
was demanded was not perfect equality, the Justices explained, but equality of a
particular kind—equality of civil rights. It demanded, that is, limited equality:
an equality not across society or even across government action, but only when
those rights required for the “security and firm establishment” of liberty were at
stake.
2. On “Running the Slavery Argument into the Ground”
Centering the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments’ protections against
racial discrimination on the equality of rights principle provided a way in which
people could advocate for broader constitutional protections while assuaging
skeptics’ fears that the federal government was going too far. As a limited vision
of constitutional equality, it provided common ground for lawmakers and jurists
47. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 67.
48. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344–45 (1879) (The “one great purpose” of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments was “to raise the colored race from that condition of inferiority and servitude in which
most of them had previously stood, into perfect equality of civil rights with all other persons”).
49. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 70.
50. Id. at 70–71; see also id. at 81 (“We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by
way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within
the purview of [the Equal Protection Clause]. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a
strong case would be necessary for its application to any other.”).
51. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880); see also id. at 307–08 (“The words of the
[Fourteenth] amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive
immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race—the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against
them distinctively as colored—exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society,
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps
towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race.”).
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of diverse ideological commitments in their efforts to give meaning to the
constitutional transformation of the Civil War and Reconstruction. But its
strength was also a liability when the Supreme Court adopted a narrow,
formalistic approach to the equality of rights principle and used it to contain the
egalitarian potential of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
One of the interpretive moves the Justices made in cabining the scope of
constitutional equality was to disaggregate their analyses of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. By sharpening the separation between claims based
on the Thirteenth Amendment and those made on the Fourteenth Amendment,
they obscured or dismissed the ways in which Thirteenth Amendment principles
could infuse the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to produce a distinctive,
robust constitutional antidiscrimination principle. This disaggregation also
allowed the Court to develop the state action limitation on the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
This dynamic was displayed most famously in the 1883 Civil Rights
Cases,52 in which the Supreme Court struck down most of the 1875 Civil Rights
Act. Writing for an 8–1 majority, Justice Joseph P. Bradley replaced the broadbrushstroke “one pervading purpose” rhetoric of the Slaughterhouse Cases with
a more particularized approach to the Reconstruction Amendments.53 “We must
never forget that the province and scope of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments are different,” he explained.54 Bradley first considered whether the
Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the authority to prohibit racial
discrimination in public accommodations. He concluded that the amendment’s
constraints applied only to the actions of state and local government, not to those
of private individuals, thereby rejecting the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis
for the law.55 He then turned to the Thirteenth Amendment. Although this
Amendment did not have the same “state action” limitation of the Fourteenth,
and therefore could be applied to private activity, he insisted that the Thirteenth
Amendment only empowered Congress to regulate rights that were necessary to
wipe out the “badges and incidents” of slavery.56 The right to nondiscriminatory
access to public accommodations, he concluded, did not fall in this category. “It
would be running the slavery argument into the ground,” Bradley wrote, “to
make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make
as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach
or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of
intercourse or business.”57
By bifurcating the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court
produced a weakened version of the equality of rights principle. The Court
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 21, at 103–10.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 23.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 20–22.
Id. at 24–25.
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refused to read the Fourteenth Amendment as informed by Thirteenth
Amendment values—as Republicans in Congress did in the decade following
the Civil War58 and as the Court seemed inclined to do in its earlier cases.59
Instead, in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court took a divide and dismiss approach.
The Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment failed to justify the 1875
Civil Rights Act because it applied only to state action—ignoring the fact that
many involved in the framing and ratification of the Amendment held a more
nuanced understanding of the limits of the Amendment; that they understood
that a state that refused to protect the civil rights of its people because of their
race might be in violation of the Amendment.60 And the Court concluded that
the Thirteenth Amendment failed to justify the 1875 Civil Rights Act because
discrimination in public accommodations was not closely enough related to the
institution of chattel slavery at which the Amendment was primarily aimed—
ignoring the way the equal civil rights principle that emerged from debates over
enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment shifted attention from the brutal facts of
slavery to the conditions of full freedom in American society.61
In the infamous case of Plessy v. Ferguson,62 the Justices followed
Bradley’s course from the Civil Rights Cases, adopting a narrow “badges and
incidents” reading of the Thirteenth Amendment—and quoting along the way
Justice Bradley’s complaints about running slavery arguments into the ground.63
Justice Henry Billings Brown, writing for an eight-Justice majority that upheld
Louisiana’s law requiring racial segregation in railroad cars, concluded: “A
statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored
races—a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races and which
must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race by
color—has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or
reestablish a state of involuntary servitude.”64 He similarly dismissed the
Fourteenth Amendment claim: “The object of the amendment was undoubtedly
to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature
of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon

58. See infra Part I.A–C.
59. See infra Part I.D.1.
60. PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 87–128 (2011);
RUTHERGLEN, supra note 21, at 71–80.
61. A representative example can be found in the words of Senator Lyman Trumbull during debate over
the 1866 Civil Rights Act, when he said: “[A]ny statute which is not equal to all, and which deprives any citizen
of civil rights which are secured to other citizens, is an unjust encroachment upon his liberty; and is, in fact, a
badge of servitude which, by the Constitution, is prohibited.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
The focus here is on citizenship and liberty and “badges of servitude,” not on a mechanical application of “the
slavery argument” racially discriminatory practices, which was Justice Bradley’s approach in the Civil Rights
Cases.
62. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
63. Id. at 542–43 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883)).
64. Id. at 543.
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color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.”65
The Court thus produced two separate constitutional nondiscrimination
principles. One, drawn exclusively from the Fourteenth Amendment, was broad
but thin (in that it immunized private actors from constitutional scrutiny). The
other, based solely on the Thirteenth Amendment, ran deeper (in that it applied
to private actors) but only along a narrow channel (in that it applied only to those
rights that involve “badges and incidents” of slavery, narrowly conceived). By
insisting upon more precisely defined categories of constitutional analysis, the
Court had tamed the fertile ambiguities of Reconstruction constitutionalism.
3. Civil Rights According to Justice Harlan
It was left to Justice John Marshall Harlan, the sole dissenter in the Civil
Rights Cases and Plessy, to push back against the Court’s sharply defined
categories of analysis. He offered instead a holistic approach, premised on the
equality of rights principle. Whereas the majority opinions in the Civil Rights
Cases and Plessy assessed the antidiscrimination protections of the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments separately, Harlan slid back and forth between the
two, relying on the category of civil rights to define and delineate his
understanding of legal equality. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
protected not against racial discrimination generally, he reasoned, but racial
discrimination when civil rights were at stake.
In his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Harlan began with a
conventional definition of civil rights. They were “those fundamental rights
which, by universal concession, inhere in a state of freedom.”66 He went through
the rights protected in the 1875 Civil Rights Act, explaining how each implicated
civil rights. The ability to travel without constraint was a condition of freedom.67
The right to lodging was fundamental, with the requirement that innkeepers
serve all comers long recognized in common law.68 The 1875 Civil Rights Act,
therefore, did nothing more than protect rights “inhering in a state of freedom,
and belonging to American citizenship.”69 Civil rights, according to Harlan,
65. Id. at 544.
66. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 34 (1883).
67. Id. at 39.
68. Id. at 40–41.
69. Id. at 26. With regard to “places of public amusement,” access to which were also protecting in the
1875 law, Harlan argued not that access to these spaces implicated civil rights, but the fact that these operations
required state licensing “imports in law equality of right at such places among all the members of that public.”
Id. at 41. Harlan also cited Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877), in which the Court held that the due process
clause did not protect private industry against economic regulation, for the argument that property becomes
“clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence and affect the community
at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect,
grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good
to the extent of the interest he has thus created.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 42 (quoting Munn, 94 U.S. at
126). Amusements, Harlan insisted, are “not a matter purely of private concern.” Id. Harlan employed some
rather loose reasoning here. He moved from a discussion of the enforcement provision of the Thirteenth
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were “rights of a character so necessary and supreme, that, deprived of their
enjoyment in common with others, a freeman is not only branded as one inferior
and infected, but, in the competitions of life, is robbed of some of the most
essential means of existence.”70 His understanding of civil rights did not require
him to analogize slavery to discrimination on public transportation or in public
accommodations; rather, it required assessing the conditions of human freedom
and recognizing the dignity costs of racial exclusion.
Harlan also took on the majority’s concern that the legislation attempted to
regulate social rights. “I agree that government has nothing to do with social, as
distinguished from technically legal, rights of individuals,” he noted.71 “No
government ever has brought, or ever can bring, its people into social intercourse
against their wishes. Whether one person will permit or maintain social relations
with another is a matter with which government has no concern.”72 But social
relations were not the issue here. “The rights which Congress, by the act of 1875,
endeavored to secure and protect are legal, not social, rights.”73 And “equality
of civil rights,” by virtue of the amended Constitution, “now belongs to every
citizen.”74
Justice Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,75 in which he
concluded that access to public modes of transportation was a civil right (and
not a social right as the majority held), also emphasized the interlinkages
between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. He wrote:
The Thirteenth Amendment does not permit the withholding or the deprivation
of any right necessarily inhering in freedom. It not only struck down the
institution of slavery as previously existing in the United States, but it prevents
the imposition of any burdens or disabilities that constitute badges of slavery
or servitude. It decreed universal civil freedom in this country.76

When that amendment was “found inadequate to the protection of the rights of
those who had been in slavery, it was followed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
which added greatly to the dignity and glory of American citizenship and to the
security of personal liberty . . . .”77 He then brought the two together as
expressing the unified principle of equal civil rights: “These two amendments,
if enforced according to their true intent and meaning, will protect all the civil

Amendment to a discussion of the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. From here, he slid into
a discussion of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment (the basis for the due process claim raised by the
business owners in Munn). He then concluded by insisting that he had only been talking about the enforcement
provision of the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 43.
70. Id. at 39–40.
71. Id. at 59.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896).
76. Id. at 555.
77. Id.
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rights that pertain to freedom and citizenship.”78 The “color-blind” Constitution
prohibited second-class citizenship, he wrote.79 “In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law.”80
Justice Harlan’s dissents provide a lost alternative in the genealogy of the
equality of rights principle. He shows what Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence would have looked like in the decades following Reconstruction
if the Court had been more attuned to ways in which those who drafted and
defended the Fourteenth Amendment understood Thirteenth Amendment values
as permeating its meaning. He showed how the equality of rights principle could
blur the sharp edges of the “state-action” limitation on the Fourteenth
Amendment and expand the Amendment’s protections against racial
discrimination. The touchstone of Justice Harlan’s racial egalitarianism was
freedom. Whereas Justice Brown dismissed the significance of the
discrimination at issue in the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Harlan described the
case as involving nothing less than “the protection of freedom and the rights
necessarily inhering in a state of freedom.”81 In this way, he insisted on keeping
slavery, emancipation, and the Thirteenth Amendment as animating values of
his Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.
II. THE EQUALITY OF RIGHTS PRINCIPLE OBSCURED
The period from the end of the Civil War through the end of the nineteenth
century was the only time in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment when
jurists openly accepted the principle of equality of rights as a legitimate basis for
determining the reach of the Amendment’s antidiscrimination requirement.
Justice Harlan disagreed with the other Justices about how the principle should
be applied, but they all agreed that the constitutional limits on discrimination
had to take account not only of the grounds for the discrimination but also the
sphere of activity in which the discrimination took place. In the twentieth
century, the principle of equality of rights never went away—and I make the
case in the following Parts of this Article that it played a key role in some of the
Supreme Court’s most significant Fourteenth Amendment decisions—but it
became harder to discern. The obscuring of this equality of rights principle in
the twentieth century was the result of changes in legal doctrine, language, and
politics.
A. DOCTRINE
The decline of the Reconstruction-era constitutional principle of equal
rights was, in part, a product of the Supreme Court’s disaggregation of the three
key rights provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment—the Privileges
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 559.
Id.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 34 (1883).
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or Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process
Clause—and the Thirteenth Amendment. As discussed above, during
Reconstruction, judges and lawmakers typically recognized the principle as
embodied in all of these constitutional provisions, with little attention to
distinctions between the component parts. But if there were to be a single
constitutional provision in which to place the equality of rights principle, it
would have been the Privileges or Immunities Clause. At the time of the drafting
of the Fourteenth Amendment, this was the phrase understood as a substitute for
“civil rights.”82 During the early stages of the five years of debate that led to the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, most of the bill’s advocates looked to
this clause as the primary basis for congressional authority.83
Yet in the Slaughterhouse Cases84 the Court narrowed the provision’s
meaning to a slim band of rights that pertain to an individual’s relationship to
the national government (a category that did not include the fundamental rights
identified in the 1866 Civil Rights Act).85 To interpret the Privileges or
Immunities Clause otherwise, the majority warned, would make the Court “a
perpetual censor upon all legislation by the States.”86
Following the Court’s ruling in the Slaughterhouse Cases, judges and
legislators channeled racial nondiscrimination claims into either equal
protection or due process categories. This channeling, as described above,
diminished the relevance of the equality of rights principle. By the late
nineteenth century, Fourteenth Amendment doctrine was moving down two
increasingly distinct tracks: fundamental constitutional rights (protected under
Lochner-era substantive due process doctrine against unreasonable
infringement, without any special attention to race) and nondiscrimination
(protected under equal protection doctrine). A more robust privileges or
immunities doctrine might have allowed courts to recognize the possibility of
rights claims that combined a concern with racial discrimination with the nature
of the rights at stake.
B. LANGUAGE
Even as the Supreme Court sought to narrowly circumscribe the definition
of civil rights, in the realm of public discourse, its usage indicated an alternative
definition.87 Outside the courts, in the years following the Civil Rights Cases,
82. See BOUTWELL, supra note 32, at 41–42.
83. McConnell, supra note 7, at 998.
84. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
85. Id. at 75–76, 79–80.
86. Id. at 78. When opponents of the proposed federal public accommodations bill cited Slaughterhouse to
support their argument that Congress lacked the authority to pass such legislation, McConnell, supra note 7, at
1000–01, the bill’s defenders increasingly emphasized the Equal Protection Clause as the constitutional basis
for the law. John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of Equal Protection of the Laws,
50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 160 n.150 (1950); Harrison, supra note 7, at 1426–33; McConnell, supra note 7, at
1001–04.
87. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 48–52, 55–57.
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people increasingly used the term civil rights to refer specifically to those rights
that the Supreme Court insisted were not civil rights: rights of access to public
accommodations. African Americans formed civil rights leagues to support
passage of state-level public accommodations, and state legislatures across
much of the nation responded with what they typically labeled “civil rights”
laws.88 Although, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court
had held that access to private businesses that served the public was not a civil
right, activists and politicians at the state level took a different path. According
to the words they used and the laws they passed, these were civil rights. “It is
nothing but civil rights for a Colored man to have the same privileges which can
be bought by any other man,” explained the editors of a Black newspaper in
1890.89
It might appear that by the turn of the twentieth century, the very definition
of civil rights that the Court rejected in the Civil Rights Cases—a definition that
assumed nondiscriminatory access to public accommodations was just as much
a condition of freedom as the right to make contracts and own property—had
become, as a result of congressional debate and state-level activism and
lawmaking, the prevailing understanding of civil rights. Yet the version of civil
rights that emerged from the battles over the 1875 Civil Rights Act and the wave
of state-level “civil rights” laws turned on a rather different premise. Whereas
the Reconstruction concept of civil rights was understood to encompass the most
essential of rights, in the decades after Reconstruction, Americans increasingly
used the term in a way that was narrower and stripped of the assumption that its
distinguishing characteristic was that it stood above all other rights categories.
By the closing decades of the nineteenth century and early decades of the
twentieth, when activists, lawyers, and scholars referenced “civil rights” in the
context of racial justice efforts, they typically did so to single out legislation and
litigation involving nondiscrimination in public facilities and public
accommodations.90 Newspaper accounts of “civil rights cases” almost always
involved controversies involving racial discrimination in public
accommodations or schools.91 When groups that formed to advance the interests
of African Americans proclaimed the importance of civil rights or charged a

88. SHAWN LEIGH ALEXANDER, AN ARMY OF LIONS: THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE BEFORE THE NAACP
30 (2012); SUSAN D. CARLE, DEFINING THE STRUGGLE: NATIONAL ORGANIZING FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, 1880–
1915, 316 n.10 (2013); MILTON R. KONVITZ, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 157–58 (1962); DAVISON M.
DOUGLAS, JIM CROW MOVES NORTH: THE BATTLE OVER NORTHERN SCHOOL SEGREGATION, 1865–1954, at 89–
91 (2005).
89. Elizabeth Dale, “Social Equality Does Not Exist Among Themselves, nor Among Us”: Baylies vs.
Curry and Civil Rights in Chicago, 1888, 102 AM. HIST. REV. 311, 318 (1997) (quoting WESTERN APPEAL, Jan,
4, 1890).
90. See FRANKLIN JOHNSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE FREE NEGRO
26–32 (1918).
91. See, e.g., Stray Southern Notes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1884, at 5; Civil Rights in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 1886, at 5; WILFORD SMITH, The Negro and the Law, in THE NEGRO PROBLEM: A SERIES OF ARTICLES
BY REPRESENTATIVE AMERICAN NEGROES OF TO-DAY 125–59 (Booker T. Washington ed., 1903).
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committee with advancing civil rights, they were usually referencing efforts to
enforce state public accommodations laws.92
Then, in the mid-twentieth century, Americans remade the public meaning
of civil rights once again. A term that first described a collection of essential
rights and then morphed into a label for antidiscrimination policy involving
public accommodations took on a new meaning, this time as a general norm of
government racial nondiscrimination. It was this iteration of civil rights that
became the commonplace label for the modern movement for racial equality.93
With this latest version of civil rights ascendent in public discourse, the very
phrase that best captured the predominant nondiscrimination norm of
Reconstruction—“equal civil rights”—took on an archaic quality, its meaning
obscure, or seemingly redundant. The evolution of the meaning of this critical
term make the lineage of the equal rights principle less accessible to modern
Americans.
C. RACIAL POLITICS
Political developments also worked to marginalize the equality of rights
principle in mainstream legal discourse. Those who sought to limit the
egalitarian potential of Reconstruction attacked the equal rights principle as too
threatening to the status quo, seeing it as an entering wedge for more expansive
federal nondiscrimination requirements.94 For those who sought to limit the
transformative potential of the constitutional revolution of the Reconstruction
amendments, whether in the name of federalism or white supremacy, a robust,
dynamic equality of rights principle went too far and risked too much disruption
to the racial status quo. As the Reconstruction moment was gradually displaced
by a re-imposition of white supremacist control across the South and a loss of
interest in continued federal intervention in Washington, D.C.,95 the principle of
equal civil rights—a principle born in part from a felt need to rein in the
egalitarian abolitionist vision of Radical Republicans—needed to be reined in
still further. This, in effect, was what the Supreme Court did in the Civil Rights
Cases, Plessy, and numerous other decisions in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries: nominally accepting equality of rights as a constitutional
principle but defining it narrowly so that it failed to provide federal protection
against the tightening noose of Jim Crow.
This is not to say that African Americans and more egalitarian-minded
whites put up much of a fight on behalf of the equality of rights principle.
92. See, e.g., Our New Legal Bureau, CRISIS, Jan. 1, 1914, at 139.
93. I detail the evolution of the term civil rights in the twentieth century in SCHMIDT, supra note 17, 53–
134; see also RISA GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 16–50 (2007); Christopher W. Schmidt, The
Civil Rights–Civil Liberties Divide, 12 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 21–24 (2016); Christopher W. Schmidt, Legal
History and the Problem of the Long Civil Rights Movement, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1081, 1094–97 (2016).
94. This was the core argument of opponents of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 34–
41, and of the majority in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 42–44 (1883).
95. See FONER, supra note 15, at 460–601.
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Although it served an important role in allowing the constitutional
transformation of Reconstruction to move forward, it was always an approach
to constitutional equality distinguished as much by its limits as by its liberatory
potential.96 From the perspective of freed people who were trying to craft a
dignified life out of the abstract promises of equality emanating from
Washington, D.C., the legalistic distinctions between spheres of rights that so
occupied lawmakers, judges, and editorial writers failed to capture their lived
experiences. Just as leaders in the African American community resisted the idea
of placing the vote into a category of rights that was somehow less urgent and
fundamental than the rights to make contracts, own property, and go to court,
they also resisted the idea of placing the affronts to dignity that accompanied
denial of service by public accommodations into some lesser category of racial
harms.97 After passage of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, some attempted to use the
new law to demand access to public accommodations.98 They fought for the
broadened concept of civil rights contained in the 1875 Civil Rights Act and
condemned the Supreme Court when it struck the Act down.99 The people who
were most dedicated to fighting for racial equality fought for “civil rights” when
the opportunity presented itself, but this was not a term or a concept that they
generally rallied around. If they were going to frame their demands for racial
justice in terms of rights, African Americans tended to talk of the rights of
citizens or public rights100 or, simply, equal rights.101
When political circumstances and ideological commitments were right, the
principle of equal civil rights could be a powerful tool for extending the reach
of constitutional nondiscrimination norms. Congressional Republicans during
Reconstruction showed the principle’s potential, as did Justice Harlan in the
decades following Reconstruction. But when circumstances and commitments
changed, its limitations and liabilities were exposed, and it was left with few
advocates. And it was not the kind of principle that activists working outside the

96. See SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 11–52.
97. See “Memorial of the National Convention of Colored People Praying to be Protected in Their Civil
Rights,” H.R. and S. Docs., 1584, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess., Misc. S. Doc. No. 21 (Dec. 19, 1873) (“The recognitions
made within a few years respecting in part our rights, make us more sensitive as to the denial of the rest . . . . The
protection of civil rights in the persons of every inhabitant of the country is the first and most imperative duty
of the Government.”); The Civil Rights Convention, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1873, at 1; HUGH DAVIS, “WE WILL
BE SATISFIED WITH NOTHING LESS”: THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH
DURING RECONSTRUCTION 102–09 (2011).
98. See HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 45–54 (1908); MASUR,
EXAMPLE, supra note 20, at 112.
99. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, 45–46.
100. See Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality, and the Conceptual Roots of the Plessy Challenge,
106 MICH. L. REV. 777 (2008); Rebecca J. Scott, Discerning a Dignitary Offense: The Concept of Equal “Public
Rights” During Reconstruction, 38 L. & HIST. REV. 519 (2020); FONER, supra note 45, at 140–42.
101. See, e.g., “Civil Rights: Resolutions of the Legislature of South Carolina,” H.R. and S. Docs., 1617,
43rd Cong., 1st Sess., Misc. H.R. Doc. No. 25 (Dec. 15, 1873). (Discrimination against Black people in travel
and public accommodations results in a “degradation of their manhood and the violation of their equal rights as
human beings”).
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formal institutions of power rallied around. It was a principle that channeled and
chastened egalitarian sentiment, and hence was ill-suited to the language of
mobilization and protest.
III. DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF RACE DISCRIMINATION
By the early decades of the twentieth century, equality of rights was no
longer a recognized principle of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine. Judges
showed more interest in deploying the Fourteenth Amendment as a bulwark
against economic regulation than against white supremacy. Racial justice
activists rallied around broader and bolder visions of racial equality. The very
label that described the core of the equality of rights principle—civil rights—
had been repurposed in mainstream American discourse. The loss of this
doctrine meant that American political and legal discourse no longer had a legal
category that had played a critical role in the Amendment’s first decades—at
times strengthening the cause of racial justice, at times limiting it, and often
doing both at the same time.
Yet even as these developments pushed aside the equality of rights
principle, the Supreme Court continued to rely on its core assumptions because
the Justices still wanted to apply a nondiscrimination principle that could strike
down certain forms of racial discrimination while upholding others. For this
reason, the equality of rights principle lived on, often featuring in highly
consequential cases, but its role was obscured, causing more confusion than
direction for those trying to make sense of the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine.
In this Part, I consider two landmark twentieth-century Supreme Court
decisions involving racial discrimination in the context of rights the Court
deemed to be fundamental to civic life. Buchanan v. Warley involved property
rights; Brown v. Board of Education, education. In each, the Justices struggled
to offer a persuasive account of what they were doing, leaving legal
commentators, at the time of the decisions and ever since, to puzzle over the
doctrinal justifications and implications of these decisions. Much of this
confusion, I argue, can be traced to the disappearance of the equality of rights
principle as a recognized feature of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. In
both Buchanan and Brown, the Court operated on a set of assumptions that were
familiar to the Reconstruction generation but that had become obscured to later
generations.
A. BUCHANAN V. WARLEY
In its unanimous 1917 decision in Buchanan v. Warley, the Supreme Court
struck down a Louisville, Kentucky city ordinance designed to preserve the
city’s patterns of residential segregation.102 Louisville’s “ordinance to prevent
102. 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).

April 2022

THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT ECHOES

749

conflict and ill feeling between the white and colored races” prohibited African
Americans from moving into blocks that were majority white and whites from
moving into blocks that were majority African American.103 The regulation,
according to Justice William R. Day, “destroy[ed] the right of the individual to
acquire, enjoy, and dispose of his property” and thus violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.104This was an impressive victory for the
battle against Jim Crow at a time when such victories were rare, and racial justice
activists praised the ruling.105 Moorfield Storey, president of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, described Buchanan as
“the most important decision that has been made since the Dred Scott case.”106
For commentators at the time of Buchanan and for generations of scholars
ever since, the most puzzling aspect of the case was why the Supreme Court
struck down this particular segregation law while leaving untouched other
precedents that upheld segregation laws.107 Plessy v. Ferguson, which upheld
segregation on railroad travel, remained good law in the wake of Buchanan, as
did an 1899 Supreme Court ruling that rejected a challenge to segregated schools
and an 1883 ruling that rejected a challenge to a state anti-miscegenation law.108
Before Buchanan, state courts that had upheld residential segregation policies
cited these cases as precedents to justify their rulings.109 According to the
Kentucky Court of Appeals, “we see but little difference in the prevention by
law of the association of white and colored pupils in the schools of the state and
in the prevention of their living side by side in their homes.”110
The best explanation for Buchanan was that the Justices viewed property
rights as different from the rights involved in public accommodations or
education or marriage. The Court’s reasoning thus turned on a simple, if never

103. Id. At 70–71.
104. Id. At 80.
105. PATRICIA SULLIVAN, LIFT EVERY VOICE: THE NAACP AND THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 65, 72–75 (2009) (describing the decision’s energizing effect on the early NAACP); see also
Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881, 939, 947 (1998); Roger
L. Rice, Residential Segregation by Law, 1910-1917, 34 J. S. HIST. 179, 198–99 (1968); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.,
Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 1: The Heyday of Jim Crow,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 508–09 (1982) (describing press response).
106. Schmidt, supra note 105, at 522.
107. Id. At 509–11 (summarizing law review commentary on Buchanan).
108. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548–49 (1896); Cumming v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., 175
U.S. 528, 545 (1899); Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883).
109. See, e.g., Harden v. City of Atlanta, 93 S.E. 401, 402–03 (Ga. 1917); Harris v. City of Louisville, 177
S.W. 472, 476–77 (Ky. 1915).
110. Harris, 177 S.W. at 477. Contemporary legal commentators criticized Buchanan on this ground, noting
the inconsistencies of allowing segregation in schools and on public transportation while striking it down in this
context. See, e.g., S.S. Field, The Constitutionality of Segregation Ordinances, 5 VA. L. REV. 81, 82–83 (1917);
Note, Constitutionality of Segregation Ordinance, 16 MICH. L. REV. 109, 110 (1917); Comments,
Unconstitutionality of Segregation Ordinances, 27 YALE L.J. 393, 393 (1918).
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fully articulated, assumption: that certain forms of state-mandated racial
discrimination were constitutionally permissible, while others were not.111
To the extent that Justice Day articulated and defended this assumption
(Buchanan is a notoriously opaque opinion), he did so by drawing on the legal
achievements of Reconstruction. He referenced the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
jury discrimination cases from 1879–80 in which the Court included sweeping
assertions of the racial egalitarian goals of the Reconstruction Amendments.112
Day asked:
In the face of these constitutional and statutory provisions can a white man be
denied, consistently with due process of law, the right to dispose of his
property to a purchaser by prohibiting the occupation of it for the sole reason
that the purchaser is a person of color intending to occupy the premises as a
place of residence?113

Justice Day went on to delineate a limiting principle to his
nondiscrimination holding. Property was different from other potential
nondiscrimination claims because it was a fundamental right. The precedents
and statutes that had prohibited racial discrimination “did not deal with the social
rights of men, but with those fundamental rights in property which it was
intended to secure upon the same terms to citizens of every race and color.”114
In support of this point, Justice Day cited the Civil Rights Cases, in which the
Court, in the process of declaring public accommodations outside the realm of
civil rights, and thus beyond the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment,
emphasized that property rights were at the core of the civil rights category.115
Justice Day’s reading of Reconstruction justified his conclusion that regulation
that infringed property rights required a distinctive antidiscrimination analysis.
The case presented does not deal with an attempt to prohibit the amalgamation
of the races. The right which the ordinance annulled was the civil right of a
white man to dispose of his property if he saw fit to do so to a person of color
and of a colored person to make such disposition to a white person.116

Buchanan was an opinion whose reasoning was grounded in the
Reconstruction-era equality of rights concept, but it was decided at a moment in
history when that concept had become obscured in legal discourse. Most
111. Alongside the right to own property, the Court placed the right to pursue one’s profession as so
fundamental that racial distinctions were generally not permitted. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373
(1886) (striking down on equal protection grounds the racially discriminatory application of a laundry licensing
policy); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 38 (1915) (striking down on equal protection grounds an Arizona law that
limited employment of non-citizens). In Truax, the Court treated the right to pursue one’s profession, like the
property right recognized in Buchanan, as not a free-standing right against government regulation, but a right
that could not be conditioned on certain grounds—in this case, citizenship. Truax thus offers something of a
preview of the equality of rights principle as it would develop in the 1960s and 1970s. See infra Part V.
112. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 76–79 (1917).
113. Id. At 78.
114. Id. At 79.
115. Id. (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883)).
116. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 81.
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notably, the term “civil rights” no longer served to delineate and differentiate
categories of rights. A decision that would have been readily explainable using
the rights categories of the 1860s and 1870s puzzled many Americans of the
early twentieth century. Buchanan remains today an awkward fit in histories of
the Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.117
B. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
Chief Justice Earl Warren’s reasoning in Brown v. Board of Education
followed a path analogous to Justice Day’s in Buchanan. Its holding was
premised on the assumption that rights pertaining to certain realms of society
were more fundamental than others, and that racial restrictions on the most
fundamental of rights should be treated differently when applying the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Buchanan, the fundamentality of the right at issue was beyond
question; property rights were foundational to Anglo-American
constitutionalism and the right to buy and sell property was one of the rights
enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The right at issue in Brown—
education—had a thinner historical pedigree. It was not among the rights
enumerated in the 1866 Civil Rights Act. African American activists and Radical
Republicans sometimes claimed education as a fundamental right of citizenship
or a necessary condition of freedom,118 and a prohibition on racial discrimination
in access to public schools had been included in early versions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875.119 But this claim was always deeply contested, and supporters of
the 1875 Civil Rights Act cut the schooling provision as too controversial.120
Chief Justice Warren’s challenge in Brown was to write an opinion that
would strike down state-mandated segregation in schools as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment but to do so in a way that did not declare all statemandated discrimination unconstitutional. An opinion based on a sweeping antiracial-classification rule would entangle the Court in constitutional questions
that the Justices preferred to save for another day (particularly interracial
marriage bans).121 Chief Justice Warren needed a rationale for why education
was different, for why it was a more important right than other potential racial
117. See Christopher W. Schmidt, Buchanan v. Warley and the Changing Meaning of Civil Rights,
48 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 463, 464–66 (2018).
118. See McConnell, supra note 7, at 953–54.
119. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3434 (1870).
120. Critics argued that the school provision would result in the shutting down of schools. CONG. REC. 3,
43rd Cong., 2d Sess. 954, 979, 981, 999, 1003 (1875); The Civil-Rights Bill, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1874 at 4.
President Grant criticized the inclusion of schools in an early version of the bill, arguing the regulation of “social
relations” belonged to states and localities. President Grant and the Civil Rights Question, BALT. SUN, Nov. 21,
1874, at 1. Some African American congressmen expressed a willingness to abandon the school provision if it
would allow the rest of the bill to pass. CONG. REC. 3, 43rd Cong., 2d Sess. 957–58, 981 (1875). The House cut
the school provision (by a vote of 128 to 48) and then passed the bill 162 to 99. Id. At 1010–11. The Senate
passed the bill several weeks later. Id. At 1861–70.
121. See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213,
241–45 (1991); Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 203,
219–25 (2008).
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discrimination claims. But Fourteenth Amendment history offered the Justices
little. Those involved in the framing, ratification, and early judicial interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment generally assumed that education was less
fundamental a right as compared to those rights involving market relations and
access to the courts that were the Amendment’s central concerns.
Chief Justice Warren ultimately built his case for education’s
fundamentality not with materials drawn from history but with other, more
contemporary materials.122 He emphasized the importance of education in
modern society.123 And he turned to social psychology to demonstrate the
supposed mentally damaging effects school segregation had on African
American children.124 For these reasons, Chief Justice Warren explained,
education was distinctively important, meriting special attention from the Court
when it determined the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.125 Chief Justice
Warren’s plausible but thinly reasoned case for education exceptionalism gave
him the space to strike down racial segregation in education without necessarily
uprooting it elsewhere.
No one, including the Justices who joined the Brown decision, really
believed the Court’s conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition of
state-mandated segregation applied only to schools. Commentators responded
to Brown by declaring Plessy dead and Justice Harlan’s “colorblind” reading of
the Constitution (stripped of its “civil rights” qualification, whose significance
was lost on Americans in 1954) the law of the land.126 The Court soon followed
its Brown decision with a series of rulings striking down segregation in state
operations beyond schools, such as beaches, parks, golf courses, and buses,
offering only cursory per curiam opinions citing Brown as justification.127
Although in the aftermath of Brown these were hardly shocking rulings, even

122. See McConnell, supra note 7, at 1131–37. Warren also floated, but then abandoned, the argument that
education was an unenumerated fundamental right under the Due Process Clause. In his initial draft of Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954), the companion case to Brown involving segregated schools in the District
of Columbia, included a reference to education as a “fundamental liberty.” Other justices were uncomfortable
using the Due Process Clause to declare rights that were not enumerated in the Constitution’s text, an approach
they had criticized when earlier Supreme Courts had used unenumerated rights, such as the “freedom of
contract,” to strike down economic regulation. Warren revised Bolling so that he read the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause as requiring the federal government to provide equal protection of the laws—a more creative
exercise in constitutional interpretation, but one that avoided echoes of the Court’s discredited economic liberty
decisions. Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948–
1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 44–50 (1980).
123. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954).
124. Id. At 494–95.
125. Hence the limiting clause in Warren’s summary of the Court’s holding: “We conclude that, in the field
of public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.” Id. At 495 (emphasis added).
126. See, e.g., Editorial, Justice Harlan Concurring, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1954, at E10; Edmond Cahn,
Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 153 (1955); Schmidt, supra note 121, at 231–33.
127. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (parks); Gayle
v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per
curiam) (golf courses); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam)
(beaches).

April 2022

THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT ECHOES

753

some sympathetic observers wondered how exactly a decision that seemed to
turn on the uniquely important place of education in modern American society
and the supposed psychological harms segregation caused in school-age children
could serve as a rationale for desegregating a golf course.128
Brown, which Chief Justice Warren wrote as a decision that turns on the
fundamentality of education, soon became a decision representing, for many, a
general principle of racial nondiscrimination. This anti-classification reading of
Brown was always contested, though. In the following decades, when raceconscious affirmative action programs were at issue, conservatives would rally
to a colorblind reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, declaring the true legacy
of Brown and the civil rights revolution to be a prohibition on racial
classifications by government of all kinds.129 Liberals insisted that the legacy of
Brown and the civil rights movement was a Fourteenth Amendment that was
read to prohibit not racial classifications but racial subordination.130 In this
ongoing debate over the meaning of Brown, almost no one reads the decision’s
rationale as turning on the fact that education deserves more protection under
the Equal Protection Clause than other, less fundamental areas of society. The
assumption, with its echoes of the Reconstruction-born equality of rights
principle, served a valuable role, allowing the Court to chart new ground in
extending Fourteenth Amendment protection against racial discrimination, but
to do so in a limited manner. The equality of rights principle quietly emerged to
provide the compromise position the Justices believed they needed to navigate
the constitutional politics of the day. But lacking a label, and with a lineage
largely lost in the miasma of skewed memories of Reconstruction, most saw its
role in Fourteenth Amendment doctrine as a sign of disingenuousness or
confusion.
***
The Justices in Buchanan and Brown struggled with the doctrinal tools they
had inherited to justify the Court’s holding. They looked to the Reconstruction
period, finding promising hints of justifications in its legal legacy. But, in the
end, they simply followed their intuition that the interests at stake were a relevant
factor in assessing the scope of constitutional equality. The equality of rights
principle resonated across time for the same reason it resonated during
Reconstruction: because it justified expanded legal protections against racial
discrimination while simultaneously cabining this expansion. Rarely given its
name or historical pedigree, it existed as a shadow presence, operating as an
amorphous collection of intuitions and undertheorized conclusions that

128. See Hutchinson, supra note 122, at 60–61 (describing critical reaction of legal scholars to the per
curiam decisions).
129. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1500–01 (2004).
130. Id. At 1474.
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produced rulings that history has deemed to be correct in outcome but failures
of doctrinal analysis.
IV. DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF STATE ACTION
Thirteenth Amendment echoes can also be found in civil-rights-era racial
discrimination cases in which the Supreme Court confronted the Fourteenth
Amendment’s state action limitation. The state action doctrine, as developed by
the Court in the late nineteenth century, turns on the straightforward premise that
the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to state actors, but not to
private actors.131 As a formal matter, the doctrine does not take account of the
nature of activity; its only concern is whether or not the government is the one
violating someone’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.132 The state action analysis
is supposed to work the same regardless of whether the right at issue is
procedural due process, free speech, or racial discrimination.
This is not how the doctrine has worked in practice. At least, this was not
how the Supreme Court dealt with the state action limitation during the period
from the 1940s through the 1970s. In cases involving particularly egregious acts
of racial discrimination—racial discrimination that involved the denial of
important rights—the Court adopted a more lenient approach, finding ways to
expand the reach of the Equal Protection Clause further into the private
sphere.133 The Court did this not by abandoning the state action principle, but by
adopting a more expansive view of government responsibility when it came to
private racial discrimination that affected particularly important societal
interests.134
The Court struggled, however, to explain what it was doing in these cases.
It left behind a trail of rulings that are notoriously confused—a “conceptual
disaster area” as Charles Black described state action jurisprudence in 1967.135
One way to explain and justify these cases is to look to the Thirteenth
Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment stands apart from other rightsprotecting provisions of the Constitution in that it has no state action limitation.
The prohibition on slavery or involuntary servitude—including the “badges and
incidents” of slavery that the Court has recognized as protected by the
Amendment—applies to state and private action alike.136 Once we give space to
Thirteenth Amendment values in our interpretation of the Fourteenth

131. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 17 (1883) (“It is State action of a particular character that
is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment . . . . The
wrongful act of an individual . . . is simply a private wrong.”).
132. Christopher W. Schmidt, On Doctrinal Confusion: The Case of the State Action Doctrine, 2016 BYU
L. REV. 575, 599–600.
133. Id. At 591–93.
134. Id.
135. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection,
and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967).
136. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); RUTHERGLEN, supra note 21, at 137–51.
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Amendment, we can recognize the possibility of a more contextual state action
doctrine: one that recognizes that our understanding of state responsibility for
private action may be different when assessing claims involving discrimination
in access to different categories of rights.
Recent historical scholarship has revealed that this was basically how
lawmakers and jurists during and immediately after Reconstruction understood
the state action concept.137 They seemed to accept that the Fourteenth
Amendment could be triggered when states failed in their duty to protect certain
fundamental rights—sometimes describes as “natural” or “secured,” in that
government did not create or confer them but merely secured them against
violation.138 The same reasoning did not apply, however, when states failed to
protect against racial discrimination outside this realm of fundamental rights.139
The rights generally understood to fall in this category of “secured rights” were
those identified in the 1866 Civil Rights Act (the right to property, to make
contracts, to physical security).140 In this way, early judicial assessments of the
scope of the “badges and incidents” of slavery in the Thirteenth Amendment
overlapped with the scope of the state action requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment.141 And the rationale that explained this overlap was the equality of
rights principle.
When the Supreme Court, in the middle decades of the twentieth century,
sought to place certain forms of private racial discrimination within the ambit of
the Equal Protection Clause, there was historical material that could have been
used to justify a reconceptualized state action doctrine. At times, the Justices did
indeed draw on this history, although they did so only sporadically, never
adequately explaining what they were doing or offering a coherent alternative to
existing state action doctrine. In this Part, I consider the most famous example
in which this took place: the enigmatic landmark of twentieth-century

137. BRANDWEIN, supra note 60, at 87–128; RUTHERGLEN, supra note 21, at 76–79; G. EDWARD WHITE,
LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY, VOLUME 2: FROM RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH THE 1920S 26–49 (2016).
138. BRANDWEIN, supra note 60, at 95–97.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Most of the rights recognized as protected in the 1866 Civil Rights Act require, by definition, a state
actor. The right to sue, to testify in court, to make contracts, and to own property involve formal legal processes,
and thus necessarily involved government actors. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (“An individual
cannot deprive a man of his right to vote, to hold property, to buy and sell, to sue in the courts, or to be a witness
or a juror; he may, by force or fraud, interfere with the enjoyment of the right in a particular case; he may commit
an assault against the person, or commit murder, or use ruffian violence at the polls, or slander the good name
of a fellow citizen; but, unless protected in these wrongful acts by some shield of State law or State authority,
he cannot destroy or injure the right; he will only render himself amenable to satisfaction or punishment, and
amenable therefor to the laws of the State where the wrongful acts are committed.”). The most significant way
in which this reading of state action could allow for regulation of what is sometimes called state “inaction” under
the Fourteenth Amendment would be the failure of the state to protect individuals from private violence. See
BRANDWEIN, supra note 60, at 161–83; RUTHERGLEN, supra note 21, at 77–80; G. Edward White, The Origins
of Civil Rights in America, 64 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 755, 780–812 (2014); Steven J. Heyman, The
First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991).

756

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:3

Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, Shelley v. Kraemer.142 I then turn to
another instance in which the Court struggled with the state action doctrine in
the context of private racial discrimination, Bell v. Maryland,143 the culmination
of a line of cases in which the Court considered whether racial discrimination in
privately owned public accommodations violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Although the Court divided on the constitutional question, Justice Arthur
Goldberg wrote a concurrence in which he drew on the history of
Reconstruction, including the idea of equal civil rights, to justify his conclusion
that racial discrimination in public accommodations violated the Constitution.144
Justice Goldberg’s opinion offers the clearest effort by a Supreme Court justice
to articulate an approach to the state action doctrine that incorporated the
equality of rights principle.
A. SHELLEY V. KRAEMER
Shelley v. Kraemer, the 1948 ruling in which the Court struck down judicial
enforcement of provisions in property deeds that prohibited the sale of the
property to certain racial groups as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
can be illuminated by recognizing the Court’s tacit reliance on the principle of
equality of rights. The core puzzle of Shelley was why the Court struck down
judicial enforcement of one particular kind of private agreement, racially
restrictive covenants, while upholding judicial enforcement of virtually every
other kind of private agreement—including other private agreements that, if
converted into state policy, would have violated the Constitution.145
The reasoning of Chief Justice Fred Vinson’s opinion reveals little. There
was nothing exceptional about the role of the state in the case. Courts regularly
enforced private agreements, including agreements that entailed acts of racial
discrimination, and doing so had never before been understood as the kind of
state action that demanded application of constitutional standards.146
Generations of scholars have sought to fill in the void, suggesting various
rationales for why this particular instance was different.147

142. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
143. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
144. Id. at 286–318 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
145. See Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 451, 458–70 (2007).
146. See Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
147. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 145; Mark Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality,
33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 383 (1988); Laurence Tribe, Refocusing the “State Action” Inquiry: Separating State
Acts from State Actors, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 248, 259–66 (1985); David Haber, Notes on the Limits of
Shelley v. Kraemer, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 811 (1964); Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised
Opinion, 110 PA. L. REV. 473 (1962).
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But another way to make sense of Shelley is to connect it to the Thirteenth
Amendment and the Reconstruction concept of civil rights.148 In his opinion for
the Court, Vinson even invoked this concept by name:
It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be protected from
discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to
acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property. Equality in the enjoyment of
property rights was regarded by the framers of that Amendment as an essential
pre-condition to the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which
the Amendment was intended to guarantee.149

As evidence that the Court had already accepted this reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Vinson cited Buchanan.150 Under this approach,
property rights might be treated differently than other kinds of rights. They were
more fundamental and therefore they would be more thoroughly protected under
the American constitutional system. So judicial enforcement of restrictions on
property might be unconstitutional even though judicial enforcement of other
forms of private racial discrimination might not be. When it came to racially
exclusionary practices, property was different. This was a premise of civil rights
circa 1866—and, more generally, the equality of rights principle that guided
early conceptions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yet by 1948, this principle did not resonate as it had in the 1860s. Having
the Equal Protection Clause apply one way to government action involving a
select group of fundamental rights, and another way to other government action,
strained against contemporary trends in equal protection doctrine and racial
justice activism, both of which were moving toward a general presumption
against racial discrimination in public life. The Shelley Court did not want to
apply this presumption. To do so would sweep too far, calling into question
judicial enforcement of all sorts of private activity. The Justices instead turned
to the older concept of civil rights—and even called it out by name—because it
allowed them to expand the reach of the equal protection clause while at the
same time cabining that expansion. Justice Vinson’s half-hearted efforts to
explain the Court’s reasoning, including his oblique references to
Reconstruction history, made little sense to commentators then or now.
148. This basic insight—that Shelley can best be justified by looking to the Thirteenth Amendment— tracks
an argument that Mark Rosen made in his important 2007 article. Rosen, supra note 145. The primary distinction
between my approach and Professor Rosen’s is that he argues that Shelley would have been better justified on
the basis of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as authorized by the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Id. at 483–98. In contrast, I argue that Shelley could be better justified not by removing it from the Fourteenth
Amendment canon, but by recognizing the Thirteenth Amendment principles that informed the Court’s reading
of the Fourteenth Amendment—and thereby reconceptualizing the doctrinal foundations of the Fourteenth
Amendment canon.
149. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1948).
150. Id. at 11. The connection between Shelley and the equality of civil rights principle is further illustrated
by turning to Shelley’s companion case, Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), which challenged the judicial
enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant in Washington, D.C. As the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply
to the governing policies of the nation’s capital, the Court decided this case on the alternate grounds of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Id. at 30–31.
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B. BELL V. MARYLAND
The Supreme Court’s confrontation with appeals of criminal convictions
of people who were arrested for taking part in the lunch counter sit-in protest
movement that swept across the South in the winter and spring of 1960 raised
issues that were analogous to Shelley. The legal issue in these cases centered on
the state action doctrine. Specifically, the cases asked whether people who
operated businesses that catered to the general public—indeed that provided a
vital service of public life—should be treated as state actors and therefore
constrained by the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment (at least when it
came to racial discrimination in their service policies); or, alternately, whether a
state government that criminally prosecutes sit-in protesters on charges of
trespass or disorderly conduct—prosecutions that were formally race-neutral but
originated as acts of racial discrimination—was in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.151
The challenge for the Court in the sit-in cases was analogous to the
challenge the Court faced in Buchanan and Brown. In those cases, the Court had
to explain why the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited government from
mandating racial segregation in the realm of property ownership and schooling,
respectively, while not necessarily prohibiting all forms of government
mandated racial segregation. In the sit-in cases, for those Justices who wanted
to overturn the convictions of lunch counter sit-in protesters as unconstitutional
on equal protection grounds, the challenge was to justify this holding without
exploding the entire state action limitation on the Fourteenth Amendment. (The
idea of abandoning the state action requirement had some support in the
academic community at the time, but none of the Justices on the Supreme Court
expressed interest in completely abandoning the state action doctrine152). The
most intuitively plausible approach was to simply recognize that public
accommodations were different from other privately operated businesses and
that racial segregation in this realm of society was more wrongful—that it
crossed the threshold from a policy issue to a constitutional one. To achieve this
end, the largely forgotten but not quite lost language of 1866 civil rights proved
helpful.
In the last of the sit-in cases, Bell v. Maryland,153 Justice Arthur Goldberg
wrote a concurrence in which he concluded that racial discrimination in privately
owned public accommodations violated the Equal Protection Clause.154 He read
Brown as having “affirmed the right of all Americans to public equality.”155 He
favored the broad brushstroke, aggregative approach to the Reconstruction
151. See CHRISTOPHER W. SCHMIDT, The Justices, in THE SIT-INS: PROTEST AND LEGAL CHANGE, IN THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 114–51 (2018).
152. See Christopher W. Schmidt, The Sit-ins and the State Action Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS.
J. 767, 781–86 (2010).
153. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
154. Id. at 286–318 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 288.
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Amendments that was common among lawmakers during Reconstruction and
that was carried on by Justice Harlan in the 1880s and 1890s. “The Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,” Justice Goldberg wrote in his
concurrence, “do not permit Negroes to be considered as second-class citizens
in any aspect of our public life . . . . Our fundamental law . . . insures an equality
of public benefits.”156
Justice Goldberg defended his reading of the Reconstruction Amendments
as based on the “intent and purposes of the Framers.”157 He then offered a series
of quotations from cases in which the Court located a general equal civil rights
principle in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.158 He cited, for
example, the 1879 case of Ex Parte Virginia,159 in which the Court wrote that
the “one great purpose” of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments was “to
raise the colored race from that condition of inferiority and servitude in which
most of them had previously stood, into perfect equality of rights with all other
persons.”160
Justice Goldberg then argued that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment understood the category of civil rights to include access to public
accommodations. He centered this argument on the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
the legislative “precursor of the Fourteenth Amendment,” which, he claimed,
was generally “understood to open to Negroes places of public
accommodation.”161 He concluded: “A review of the relevant congressional
debates reveals that the concept of civil rights which lay at the heart both of the
contemporary legislative proposals and of the Fourteenth Amendment
encompassed the right to equal treatment in public places . . . .”162 Although
Justice Goldberg’s reading of the history is questionable—Reconstruction
lawmakers were far more skeptical toward including public accommodations in
the civil rights category than he recognized163—his line of reasoning in Bell
illustrates the way the principle of equal civil rights provided a limited
reconceptualization of the Fourteenth Amendment’s state action limitation. It
allowed Goldberg to conclude that the Equal Protection Clause applied to this
particular form of private activity—racial discrimination in public
accommodations—while still maintaining the state action limitation in other
circumstances.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 289.
158. Id. (quoting Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 71 (1873); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344–45 (1879);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 386 (1880)).
159. 100 U.S. 339.
160. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 252 (1964) (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 344–45).
161. Id. at 290 n.5.
162. Id. at 293.
163. Some of Goldberg’s more sweeping historical assertions push well beyond the historical record. See,
e.g., id. at 290 (“[I]t appears that the contemporary understanding of the general public was that freedom from
discrimination in places of public accommodation was part of the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of equal
protection.”).
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C. STATE ACTION AND EQUALITY OF RIGHTS
The equality of rights framework illuminates critical junctures in the
historical development of state action doctrine. It helps to explain how the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment could understand its protections as
potentially reaching certain private activities (those that involve racial
exclusions pertaining to fundamental rights),164 while leaving most of the private
sphere outside its reach. It helps to explain how the Supreme Court’s state action
doctrine, as laid out most famously in the Civil Rights Cases, relied on a partial
rejection of the equality of rights approach.165 And it helps to explain how, in
the middle decades of the twentieth century, the equality of rights principle
operated in subtle and underrecognized ways to undermine the strictures of the
modern state action doctrine.
V. THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT ECHOES BEYOND RACE
In this Part, I turn to how the equality of rights principle operated in
Fourteenth Amendment cases beyond race. The linkage to the Thirteenth
Amendment is necessarily lessened in these cases—the Thirteenth Amendment
echoes fainter—yet the central elements of the equality of rights principle
remain. The Justices made the same basic analytical moves as in the race cases
discussed above. Rather than following the tiers rulebook and its assumption
that the appropriate level of scrutiny could be found by separately analyzing the
nature of the classification and nature of the interests, the Justices in these cases
considered how a given basis of discrimination operated when applied to a
particular sphere of activity. They then determined whether the discriminatory
policy denied what Harlan referred to as “the rights necessarily inhering in a
state of freedom.”166 The subjectivity of this determination is unavoidable, and
it has been a frequent point of critique for cases that adopt an equality of rights
approach.
Yet the value of this approach was found not only in its ability to break
through the stasis that had infected the tiers approach and expand the reach of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s equality protections, but also in its ability to
constrain. Across generations, jurists have been pulled to the equality of rights
principle because it was, in critical ways, more limited than alternatives.
Assessing new claimants for constitutional protections under the tiers approach
has an all-or-nothing quality. When given the choice, the Court for the last half
century has typically chosen nothing. The equality of rights approach allowed

164. To be more precise: at least some of the framers seemed to assume that if a state refused to protect
freedpeople from private violations of their civil rights, then that particular form of state inaction could amount
to a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, enforceable by congressional legislation under the amendment’s
enforcement clause and/or by the courts.
165. See supra Part I.D.2.
166. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 34 (1883).
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for an assessment of potential constitutional violations that is more flexible but
also more directed.
A. THE TIERS OF EQUAL PROTECTION
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as Earl Warren’s term as Chief Justice
came to an end and Warren Burger’s began, the Court sought to make sense of
what it had done with equal protection doctrine over the previous decades. The
Warren Court had given new meaning to the Fourteenth Amendment, expanding
the role of the courts in using the Amendment to protect vulnerable minorities,
most especially racial minorities. Yet, for all the Warren Court’s unity of vision
on its role in the social upheavals of its day,167 underlying divisions emerged
when it came to translating that vision into constitutional doctrine. Much of the
transformative work of the Warren Court was built upon a mixture of hints of
ambitious doctrinal departures that were qualified with offramps, fallbacks, and
compromises.168 The contours and limits of the Warren Court’s transformation
of the Fourteenth Amendment remained uncertain. And although the Burger
Court had its own equal protection innovations (most notably its adoption of
heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications)169 much of its contribution in
the field of equal protection would be in crafting a doctrinal rulebook designed
to explain, and often contain, the innovations of the Warren Court.170
The centerpiece of this rulebook was the two-tiered approach to assessing
equal protection claims. Under this approach, all equal protection claims receive
“rational basis review”—the most deferential form of judicial scrutiny—and the
challenged policy is presumed constitutional unless one of two factors is met:
the classification at issue is “suspect” or the classification involves access to a
right that is “fundamental.”171 If either factor is met, a demanding strict scrutiny
standard applies, and the challenged policy is presumed unconstitutional.172
Although there were rumblings of dissatisfaction with this rulebook as it was
taking shape,173 by the 1970s most of the Justices had come to accept it as
blackletter law.
The Burger Court’s more conservative members were particularly insistent
in articulating and defending the tiered approach. It provided a basis for their
167. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE & DAVID A. STRAUSS, DEMOCRACY AND EQUALITY: THE
ENDURING CONSTITUTIONAL VISION OF THE WARREN COURT (2019); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN
COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1998).
168. A particularly valuable account of the development of Equal Protection doctrine in this period is
Klarman, supra note 121; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267
(2007); G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2005).
169. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
170. See generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF THE
JUDICIAL RIGHT (2016).
171. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 826 (5th ed., 2015).
172. Id.
173. Justice John Marshall Harlan II, for example, critiqued the entire fundamental rights prong of equal
protection doctrine as misguided. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658–63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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efforts to accept and legitimate key elements of the Warren Court’s equality
jurisprudence while cutting off most claims for further expanding its reach. With
the prominent exception of sex discrimination (which the Court classified as a
“quasi-suspect” class, activating an intermediate form of scrutiny),174 the Burger
Court largely shut off the category of suspect classifications to new entrants. It
rejected efforts to recognize as suspect classifications indigency,175 age,176 and
mental disability.177 The Burger Court took the same approach to the category
of fundamental rights, accepting those that the Court had already categorized as
fundamental—procreation,178 marriage,179 travel,180 voting181—but, with the
prominent exception of abortion,182 refusing to recognize additional
fundamental rights. The Court applied rational basis review in rejecting equal
protection challenges involving access to welfare benefits,183 housing,184 and
education.185
B. SLIDING SCALES
This new equal protection rulebook that the Burger Court inherited from
the Warren Court had prominent critics inside and outside the Court. These
critics questioned whether the tiered framework actually described what the
Court had been doing, and they questioned whether it was an approach that
described what the Court should be doing. Writing in 1972, constitutional
scholar Gerald Gunther described a “mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier
formulations of the Warren Court’s equal protection doctrine.”186 The primary
frustration was its sharply dichotomous approach. “Justices, from all segments
of the Court, sought formulations that would narrow the gap between the widely
separated tiers of the Warren Court’s equal protection.”187 “None of these
gropings has produced a fully developed alternative,” he concluded, “but all
signify a widespread inclination to reexamine old rationales.”188 A critical
question, which the Court had yet to answer, Gunther noted, was “whether

174. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
175. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
176. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
177. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
178. Edwards v. California, 814 U.S. 160 (1941).
179. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
180. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
181. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Kramer v. Union Free School District No.
15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
182. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
183. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
184. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
185. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
186. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1972).
187. Id. at 17.
188. Id. at 18.
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suspect classifications and fundamental interests were separate or interrelated
categories.”189
On the Court, the most concerted effort to craft from these “gropings” a
doctrinal alternative came from Justice Thurgood Marshall. In a series of
dissenting and concurring opinions in the 1970s and 1980s, Marshall criticized
the tiers framework. Its most serious flaw, he explained, was its inflexibility.
The Court “has apparently lost interest in recognizing further ‘fundamental’
rights and ‘suspect’ classes,”190 Marshall lamented in a 1976 dissent. This
development was “the natural consequence of the limitations of the Court’s”
approach.191
If a statute invades a “fundamental” right or discriminates against a “suspect”
class, it is subject to strict scrutiny. If a statute is subject to strict scrutiny, the
statute always, or nearly always . . . is struck down. Quite obviously, the only
critical decision is whether strict scrutiny should be invoked at all. It should
be no surprise, then, that the Court is hesitant to expand the number of
categories of rights and classes subject to strict scrutiny, when each expansion
involves the invalidation of virtually every classification bearing upon a newly
covered category.192

But to leave all other classifications to a rational basis review standard—and
hence presume them constitutional—was insufficient. Justice Marshall
explained:
It cannot be gainsaid that there remain rights, not now classified as
‘fundamental,’ that remain vital to the flourishing of a free society, and
classes, not now classified as ‘suspect,’ that are unfairly burdened by invidious
discrimination unrelated to the individual worth of their members. Whatever
we call these rights and classes, we simply cannot forgo all judicial protection
against discriminatory legislation bearing upon them, but for the rare instances
when the legislative choice can be termed ‘wholly irrelevant’ to the legislative
goal.193

189. Id. at 9 n.36. Gunther cited several law review notes and articles that explored this line of analysis:
Developments in the Law—Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1120 (1969); Frank Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 7, 36 (1969); Comment, The Evolution of Equal Protection—Education, Municipal Services, and
Wealth, 7 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 103, 106 (1972). Writing toward the end of the 1970s, another
legal scholar wrote, “[a] majority of the Court appears ready to abandon formally the rigid two tiered approach
if something better could be found to take its place.” David M. Treiman, Equal Protection and Fundamental
Rights—A Judicial Shell Game, 15 TULSA L.J. 183, 194 (1980).
190. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 319.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 320; see also id. at 319 n.1 (“Some classifications are so invidious that they should be struck
down automatically absent the most compelling state interest, and by suggesting the limitations of strict scrutiny
analysis I do not mean to imply otherwise. The analysis should be accomplished, however, not by stratified
notions of ‘suspect’ classes and ‘fundamental’ rights, but by individualized assessments of the particular classes
and rights involved in each case. Of course, the traditional suspect classes and fundamental rights would still
rank at the top of the list of protected categories, so that in cases involving those categories analysis would be
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Yet, “happily, the Court’s deeds have not matched its words,” Marshall
wrote.194 The rigid tiers of scrutiny analysis “simply do[es] not describe the
inquiry the Court has undertaken—or should undertake—in equal protection
cases. Rather, the inquiry has been much more sophisticated, and the Court
should admit as much,” he explained.195 “Time and again, met with cases
touching upon the prized rights and burdened classes of our society, the Court
has acted only after a reasonably probing look at the legislative goals and means,
and at the significance of the personal rights and interests invaded.”196 He
concluded: “All interests not ‘fundamental’ and all classes not ‘suspect’ are not
the same; and it is time for the Court to drop the pretense that, for purposes of
the Equal Protection Clause, they are.”197
As an alternative, he advocated a “spectrum of standards” analysis that
would take into account both the “constitutional and societal importance of the
interest adversely affected” and the “invidiousness of the basis upon which the
particular classification is drawn.”198 Such an approach, Marshall believed,
would better allow the court to use equal protection jurisprudence to uproot
social injustices beyond cases involving explicit racial classifications—when,
for example, mental disability intersected with where one could live199 or when
socioeconomic status intersected with educational opportunity.200 Although
Marshall did not explicitly reference the Thirteenth Amendment as informing
his sliding scales approach to Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, he did
emphasize human freedom as one of its animating principles. In one opinion, he
wrote of the need for the courts to be vigilant against discrimination that denied
vulnerable groups “human freedom and fulfillment.”201
Justice John Paul Stevens also took issue with the tiers of scrutiny
approach. In a concurrence in Craig v. Boren, the case in which the Court first
adopted an intermediate scrutiny standard for sex classifications, Stevens wrote:
functionally equivalent to strict scrutiny. Thus, the advantages of the approach I favor do not appear in such
cases, but rather emerge in those dealing with traditionally less protected classes and rights.”).
194. Id. (citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975);
United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
195. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976).
196. Id. at 320.
197. Id. at 321.
198. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see
also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230–31 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 319–21
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Chicago Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 520–21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
199. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 460–65, 478 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
200. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230–31.
201. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461 (“The interest of the retarded in establishing group homes is
substantial . . . . Excluding group homes deprives the retarded of much of what makes for human freedom and
fulfillment—the ability to form bonds and take part in the life of a community.”); see also Murgia, 427 U.S. at
320.
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I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the [tiered] analysis
of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical method of
deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain
decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent
fashion.202

He advocated a single rational basis review standard, but one that did not assume
blanket judicial deference.203 Nine years later, in a concurrence in Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, in which he was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Stevens
wrote that rather than strictly delineated tiers of scrutiny, “our cases reflect a
continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifications.”204
The Court never took up Justice Marshall’s sliding-scale or Justice
Stevens’ continuum approaches. Justice Stewart dismissed one of Justice
Marshall’s efforts to articulate his approach as “imaginative.”205 Majorities of
the Court relied on a strict tiers-of-scrutiny approach in denying heightened
scrutiny to classifications based on indigency,206 on age,207 and on mental
disability.208 As Justice Powell explained in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, in which
the Court held that education was not a fundamental right, fundamentality as a
constitutional principle did not turn on the “relative social significance” of a
particular activity.209 The only question was “whether there is a right to
education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.”210 On this
reasoning, the Court also rejected efforts to frame welfare benefits211 and
housing212 as fundamental rights. Critics on both the left and the right213 have
criticized the tiers-of-scrutiny approach, but no alternative gained traction.
Yet cases continued to arrive in which a majority of the Court chafed
against the constraints of the tiers-of-scrutiny method. In these cases, the Justices
stumbled toward the more contextual approach to equal protection that Justice
Marshall encouraged, that operated in Buchanan and Brown, and that was
embodied in the Reconstruction concept of civil rights. They relied, in other
words, on the equality of rights principle.

202. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J. concurring).
203. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 452–54 (Stevens, J. concurring).
204. Id. at 451.
205. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 40.
207. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976) (per curiam).
208. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435.
209. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33.
210. Id.
211. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
212. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
213. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Joel Alicea & John
D. Ohlendorf, Against the Tiers of Constitutional Scrutiny, 49 NAT’L. AFFS. 72 (2019),
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/against-the-tiers-of-constitutional-scrutiny.
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C. PLYLER V. DOE
In Plyler v. Doe214 the Supreme Court held that Texas violated the Equal
Protection Clause when it denied free access to public schools to undocumented
immigrant children. Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice William Brennan
conceded that undocumented immigrants are not a suspect class, but he then
sought to distinguish the children who were being excluded from public
education from adults who came into the country illegally.215 He also conceded
that education was not a fundamental right, “[b]ut neither is it merely some
governmental ‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare
legislation.”216 He nonetheless applied what appeared to be a version of
intermediate scrutiny217—albeit without explicitly identifying it as such218—and
struck down Texas’s policy.
Brennan’s opinion made motions in various directions. At times, he seemed
to characterize the policy as irrational, and thus unconstitutional even under a
deferential rational basis standard of review.219 In other places, he implied a
heightened standard of review.220 He made some broad references to the history
of the Fourteenth Amendment, writing that the “Equal Protection Clause was
intended as a restriction on state legislative action inconsistent with elemental
constitutional premises,”221 but in the end his focus was more current and
consequentialist. “By denying these children a basic education, we deny them
the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any
realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the
progress of our Nation.”222
In dissent, Chief Justice Burger wrote that the majority “abuses” the
Fourteenth Amendment with an “unabashedly result-oriented approach”223 and
a holding that “rests on such a unique confluence of theories and
rationales . . . will likely stand for little beyond the results in these particular
cases.”224 “[B]y patching together bits and pieces of what might be termed quasi-

214. 457 U.S. 202.
215. Id. at 219–20.
216. Id. at 221.
217. Id. at 224 (writing that the discrimination at issue in this case “can hardly be considered rational unless
it furthers some substantial goal of the State”).
218. At the time of Plyler, the Court had established its intermediate scrutiny standard in two lines of cases:
equal protection claims involving children born to unmarried parents, Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495 (1976),
and those involving sex-discrimination claims, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Brennan never indicated
that the Court in Plyler was applying this standard.
219. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223–24 (1982).
220. Id. at 227–30.
221. Id. at 216.
222. Id. at 223.
223. Id. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 243.
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suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis,” the Chief Justice wrote,
“the Court spins out a theory custom-tailored to the facts of these cases.”225
Plyler has always been recognized as something of a doctrinal puzzle. At
the time of the decision, legal scholar Dennis Hutchinson wrote that it “may be
the Court’s most important and groundbreaking interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause in a decade or a limited and somewhat untidy response to a
novel case.”226 For those who believe it a “constitutional landmark,” noted
Hutchinson, the Court’s opinion “cut a remarkably messy path through other
areas of the Court’s jurisprudence.”227 A chorus of critics echoed Chief Justice
Burger’s lamentations.228
Justice Marshall wrote a brief concurrence in Plyler, in which he offered
his sliding scales approach as a straightforward way to resolve this case. Looking
back to his dissent in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, he wrote:
[T]he facts of these cases demonstrate the wisdom of rejecting a rigidified
approach to equal protection analysis, and of employing an approach that
allows for varying levels of scrutiny depending upon “the constitutional and
societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized
invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is
drawn.”229

The premise here is that when certain foundational rights are at stake, such as
the right to education, the nondiscrimination norm runs deeper. Marshall’s
rationale in Plyler offers a clear application of the equality of rights principle.230
Bringing to the foreground the latent principle of equality of rights allows us to
recenter the place of Plyler in our equal protection canon. It allows us to
transform this case from a doctrinal puzzle or embarrassment to a
methodological touchstone. The equal rights principle provides an unifying

225. Id. at 244, see also id. at 248 (“The Equal Protection Clause guarantees similar treatment of similarly
situated persons, but it does not mandate a constitutional hierarchy of governmental services.”).
226. Dennis J. Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection—A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 1982 SUP. CT.
REV. 167, 167 (1982). Among the questions Hutchinson said that Plyer raised but failed to answer was whether
the Court had adopted Marshall’s sliding-scales approach to Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 167–68.
227. Id. at 184.
228. See, e.g., David Livingston, Plyler v. Doe: Illegal Aliens and the Misguided Search for Equal
Protection, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 601 (1984) (“Adding only confusion to an already incoherent and
uncertain area of equal protection jurisprudence, the Court left unresolved nearly as many constitutional
questions as it attempted to answer.”).
229. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982) (quoting Rodriguez, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)); see also Plyler, 457 U.S., at 233 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (noting that “certain interests, though not constitutionally guaranteed, must be accorded a special
place in equal protection analysis”).
230. An important precursor to Plyler was Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), in which the Court struck
down on equal protection grounds an Arizona law that limited employment of non-citizens. The Court connected
the non-discrimination requirement in the context of the right to pursue one’s profession to the history behind
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment (described in a distinctly Thirteenth-Amendment-inflected manner):
“It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community
is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment to secure.” Id. at 41.
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thread connecting the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, to Buchanan,
Brown, and Plyler. And if we push the principle to a slightly more abstracted
level, it can also help to explain and justify the recent transformations in the
constitutional status of sexual orientation discrimination.
D. LIBERTY AND EQUALITY IN JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE
The constitutional challenges to discrimination based on sexual orientation
in recent decades has produced a new wave of criticism and calls for new
approaches to areas of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine. And Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s efforts to expand constitutional protections against sexual orientation
discrimination provides another opportunity to see at work the equality of rights
principle and its foundational assumption that nondiscrimination principles run
deeper when important rights are at stake.
Beginning in the 1990s, Justice Kennedy wrote a series of decisions
striking down discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in which he
attempted to draw together principles of equality and liberty. These rulings
struck down discriminatory policies without ever holding that gays and lesbians
would be treated as a suspect class and that classifications based on sexual
orientation required some form of heightened scrutiny.
In Romer v. Evans,231 Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court
striking down an amendment to the Colorado constitution that prohibited sexual
orientation as a basis for state or local antidiscrimination policy. One of the
rationales that Justice Kennedy relied on was the idea that any law that placed a
particular group at a disadvantage when seeking supportive government policy
was unconstitutional. “A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult
for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is
itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”232
Although he does little to elaborate on the point, the justification for the holding
seems to be the intersection of the nature of the classification and the seriousness
of the disadvantage it produces on a right as basic as “seek[ing] aid from the
government.”233
Justice Kennedy further pursued this distinctive approach to Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine in Lawrence v. Texas,234 the 2003 case striking down antisodomy legislation as a violation of a fundamental right to private sexual
intimacy between consenting adults. Although he framed Lawrence as a due
process holding, Justice Kennedy insisted that his reading of the Due Process
Clause’s substantive content was shaped by equality principles. “Equality of
treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by

231. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
232. Id. at 633.
233. Id. at 634–35. As an alternative rationale, Kennedy also deemed the state interest in the amendment
based in animus and therefore categorically illegitimate even under a rational-basis review standard. Id.
234. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a
decision on the latter point advances both interests.”235 He approached this issue
from the other direction in United States v. Windsor, nominally an equal
protection ruling, but one that drew on due process principles in striking down a
provision of the federal Defense of Marriage Act.236
The most significant of Justice Kennedy’s gay rights decisions was also his
most explicit in insisting that due process and equal protection be understood as
mutually supportive constitutional principles. According to the reasoning of his
majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges,237 the Court’s 2015 ruling striking
down bans on same-sex marriage, the mere fact of discrimination based on
sexual orientation was not enough to justify striking down bans on same-sex
marriage.238 Nor were constraints on the right to marry enough.239 But together,
Justice Kennedy found the two met the threshold of a finding of
unconstitutionality.
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a
profound way though they set forth independent principles. Rights implicit in
liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts
and are not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive
as to the meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one Clause
may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and
comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the
identification and definition of the right . . . . This interrelation of the two
principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must become.240

Justice Kennedy’s opinion can be read as yet another instantiation of the
equality of rights principle.241 A central assumption of the holding seems to be
that when certain important rights are at issue—rights that are essential to a fully
free existence—antidiscrimination principles apply more forcefully. Much of
Justice Kennedy’s opinion is dedicated to demonstrating the importance of
marriage to American society, which then forms the basis for recognizing the
significance of discrimination in this context:

235. Id. at 575.
236. 570 U.S. 744, 769 (2013) (holding Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional as it “violates basic due
process and equal protection principles”).
237. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
238. Id. at 675.
239. Id. at 665.
240. Id. at 672; see also id. at 673 (“Each concept liberty and equal protection leads to a stronger
understanding of the other.”).
241. There are other ways to read the opinion, of course. Kenji Yoshino argues that Obergefell is best read
as a fundamental rights decision in which equal protection values help to define the nature of the right, or, as he
puts it, “a substantive due process case inflected with equality concerns.” Yoshino, New Equal Protection, supra
note 8, at 173. Yoshino terms this approach “antisubordination liberty.” Id. at 174. My reading of Obergefell in
no way detracts from that of Yoshino or others who have framed it as primarily a due process case. But, much
like Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which struck down state prohibitions on interracial marriage on both
due process and equal protection grounds, Obergefell should be understood as a landmark of both fundamental
liberty and equality.
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As the State itself makes marriage all the more precious by the significance it
attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of teaching that gays
and lesbians are unequal in important respects. It demeans gays and lesbians
for the State to lock them out of a central institution of the Nation’s society.242

The dissenters cried foul about Justice Kennedy’s doctrinal innovations.
Missing from Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the Equal Protection Clause,
Chief Justice Roberts noted, “is anything resembling our usual framework for
deciding equal protection cases.”243 He dismissed Justice Kennedy’s efforts to
create some sort of symbiosis between the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses and complained, “the majority fail[ed] to provide even a single sentence
explaining how the Equal Protection Clause supplies independent weight for its
position.”244 He then noted that under a rational basis review standard,
prohibitions on same-sex marriage should be upheld.245
Enigmatic and frustrating when assessed according to the rules of modern
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, Obergefell can best be explained as yet
another example of the Court calling upon the equality of rights principle as the
solution to a Fourteenth Amendment doctrine that has become too rigid and too
detached from the values that animated those who fought to add this Amendment
to the Constitution. It offers another demonstration of the lingering echoes of the
Thirteenth Amendment in so many of our most important Fourteenth
Amendment cases.
E. THE FAILURE OF TIERS OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Tiers of scrutiny was never a particularly generative framework for equal
protection doctrine. The Justices formally introduced it in the late 1960s as a
way of explaining and justifying work that they had already done. From that
point on, its primary role was to shut the door on novel equal protection
claims.246 This was why Justice Marshall and others insisted there were better
alternatives, and why so many of the most significant equal protection rulings
since the 1970s reached their outcomes only after sidestepping the tiers of
scrutiny framework. Even if the Court was to seriously consider adding to the
category of suspect classes, the multi-factor test it has used to assess the
question—looking at factors such as the mutability and visibility of defining
characteristics, political power, and history discrimination247—was barely
workable at is inception and has only become less so over time.

242. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015).
243. Id. at 707 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. The last classification to be deemed “suspect” by the Court was nonmarital parentage in 1977. Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766–76 (1977). On the “closure of the heightened scrutiny canon,” see Yoshino, New
Equal Protection, supra note 8, at 755–59.
247. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682–88 (1973). The foundation for this analysis is the
reference to “discrete and insular” minorities in the famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products
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The equality of rights approach that is the focus of this Article offers an
alternative framework for identifying equal protection violations.248 As
compared to the tiers of scrutiny, it has a better grounding in the history that
gave rise to the Fourteenth Amendment. It better captures the motivating
assumptions of the Supreme Court’s most important equal protection rulings.
And when we once again get a Court with a majority of Justices who want to
extend the protections of the Equal Protection Clause to new claimants, it will
provide stronger basis for doing so.
CONCLUSION
Modern American constitutionalism should give more attention to the
Thirteenth Amendment. It is a font of alternatives to our current constitutional
practices—alternatives too often forgotten or misunderstood. This basic insight
has been at the heart of legal academia’s Thirteenth Amendment revivalism of
recent decades, and one of my goals in this Article is to contribute to this body
of scholarship by bolstering the case for the relevance of the Thirteenth
Amendment.
This Article, in contrast to much recent scholarship on the Thirteenth
Amendment, does not argue for using the Thirteenth Amendment as the basis
for a radically different constitutional vision than the one we currently have.249
My effort takes a more moderate and more realistic approach. Instead of
envisioning what a very different Supreme Court or Congress might one day do
to unleash the potential of the Thirteenth Amendment, I focus on what the Court
has done. The benefit of this approach is that it offers a historical pedigree for
an approach to the Fourteenth Amendment that better explains the Amendment
in action.

Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938), which also has not aged particularly well. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
248. The other major alternative scholars have offered is to reframe potential equality claims as due process
claims. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 (2002); Yoshino, New
Equal Protection, supra note 8.
249. Scholars have argued that the Court should use the Thirteenth Amendment to strike down varied forms
of subordination, such as prohibitions on abortion, mass incarceration, and hate speech. See, e.g., Carter, supra
note 5; Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to
DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992); Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment
Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 480 (1990); PROMISES OF LIBERTY, supra note 5; Symposium—The
Thirteenth Amendment: Meaning, Enforcement, and Contemporary Implications, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1447
(2012). Others have focuses on the Thirteenth Amendment’s enforcement provision as providing congressional
authority for ambitious federal regulatory schemes. See, e.g., RUTHERGLEN, supra note 21; James Gray Pope,
The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional
Law, 1921–1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002). Jamal Greene has insightfully critiqued this scholarship—at
least as it pertains to pursuing judicial recognition of Thirteenth Amendment claims—for relying on an
unrealistic commitment to “Thirteenth Amendment optimism.” Jamal Greene, Thirteenth Amendment Optimism,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1733 (2012). Greene acknowledges that beyond the realm of judicial constitutionalism,
aspirational Thirteenth Amendment claims can provide “a potential tool for progressive political mobilization.”
Id. at 1737.

772

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:3

The Thirteenth Amendment-based idea of equality of rights does not fit
within the modern doctrinal categories. It aligns, however, with intuitions about
how constitutional rights should work that have been given recurring expression
in Supreme Court doctrine. These intuitions acknowledge the variability of
discrimination harms. They presume that a given form of discrimination can be
more or less constitutional depending on the significance of the interests at stake.
They recognize that sweeping generalizations about state versus private action
or about suspect versus non-suspect classifications fail to account for the way
the courts have given shape to equality and liberty norms.
In these patterns, we can find submerged alternatives. Although this Article
provides material that could be used to make originalist arguments, my goal is
not to look to the past to locate definitive answers to our current constitutional
controversies (in this history, I see more debate and ambiguity than resolution)
but instead to loosen conceptual limitations on how we understand where we are
now and how we got here. This history reveals alternative approaches to
contemporary problems. In comparison to the equal protection doctrine that
prevails in courts and casebooks today, an approach to the Fourteenth
Amendment that is infused with Thirteenth Amendment principles is less rigid
in application, more capable of translating evolving norms of equality into
constitutional doctrine, and better grounded in the Amendment’s original
meaning. American constitutionalism would be more honest and capable of
producing more just outcomes if we acknowledge, embrace, and expand on the
Thirteenth Amendment values that echo through the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

